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Abstract
This paper documents a new fact, then analyzes its causes and consequences: in most countries, import
tariffs and non-tariff barriers are substantially lower on dirty than on clean industries, where an industry’s
“dirtiness” is defined as its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per dollar of output. This difference in
trade policy creates a global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions in internationally traded goods and so
contributes to climate change. This global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions totals several hundred
billion dollars annually. The greater protection of downstream industries, which are relatively clean,
substantially accounts for this pattern. The downstream pattern can be explained by theories where
industries lobby for low tariffs on their inputs but final consumers are poorly organized. A quantitative
general equilibrium model suggests that if countries applied similar trade policies to clean and dirty
goods, global CO2 emissions would decrease and global real income would change little.
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1 Introduction
This paper documents a new fact, then analyzes its causes and consequences: in most countries, import
tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are lower on dirty than on clean industries, where an industry’s
“dirtiness” is measured by its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per dollar of output. This difference
between dirty and clean industries creates an implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions in internationally traded
goods and so contributes to climate change. I describe this pattern as trade policy’s environmental bias.
This bias is widespread. I find it in most countries, in tariffs and NTBs, in cooperative and non-
cooperative tariffs, and in most years. I find some evidence that these patterns have attenuated over
time, though they remain large. The implicit subsidy I estimate, of $85 to $120 per ton of CO2, is
interesting because the global social cost of CO2 emissions (and hence the optimal tax on CO2 emissions)
is usually estimated as around $40 per ton of CO2 (IWG 2016). The magnitude of the environmental bias
of trade policy is therefore larger than what research suggests is an optimal tax on CO2 emissions, and
the sign is opposite—trade policy is imposing lower tax rates on dirtier goods, while an optimal carbon
policy would impose higher tax rates on dirtier goods.
One way to interpret this fact is in terms of climate change policy. Optimal climate change policy
would impose a uniform Pigouvian tax (or equivalent quantity mechanism like a cap-and-trade market) in
all countries and industries, since CO2 creates the same climate change externality regardless of where it is
emitted. Researchers and policymakers often claim that imposing climate change policy in some countries
but not others could harm domestic energy-intensive industries and lead to relocation or “leakage” of
emissions, more than an absolute decrease in emissions. Climate change regulation is far from global and
covers about 20 percent of global CO2 emissions, including in the EU, California, and elsewhere (World
Bank 2018). Carbon prices in these policies differ substantially across regulations and are generally below
$10/ton. Some countries have considered pairing such sub-global policy with an import tariff or border
adjustment that is proportional to the CO2 emitted from producing and transporting goods.
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Of course, most countries already impose tariffs and NTBs on traded goods. This paper asks whether
dirty industries already face higher tariffs and NTBs, which would mean that countries already implicitly
have carbon tariffs in their existing trade policies. Given media emphasis on dirty industries’ political
lobbying, one might expect dirtier industries to receive relatively greater trade protection. I show that
this prediction is incorrect, and that dirtier industries face relatively low tariffs and NTBs.
I obtain these findings from regressions of tariff (or ad valorem NTB) rates on CO2 intensity. I
measure CO2 intensity by inverting a global multi-region input-output table, which accounts for emissions
1Some versions of this proposal would include rebates for exports. Several proposed U.S. climate change regulations would
implement carbon tariffs, including the Waxman-Markey Bill (the American Clean Energy and Security Act), which passed
the House but not the Senate in 2009; the American Opportunity Carbon Fee Act of 2014; and a current “carbon dividends”
proposal by the U.S. Climate Leadership Council led by James Baker, Martin Feldstein, Greg Mankiw, and publicly endorsed
by 27 economics Nobel laureates and 3500 economists. One common perception is that a carbon tariff is politically necessary
(though so far not politically sufficient) to ensure support for any U.S. climate change regulation. Legal analyses suggest that
regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) could allow such carbon tariffs, though disagree on exactly which type of
carbon tariff WTO rules would allow (Hillman 2013; Pauwelyn 2013; Cosbey et al. 2017).
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embodied in intermediate goods. For example, the CO2 emissions rate for U.S. kitchenware accounts for
the Australian coal used to produce the Chinese steel used to produce a U.S. frying pan, and the bunker
and diesel fuels used to transport each. The global input-output data this paper uses, from Exiobase,
describe 48 countries and 163 industries, and so generate measures of CO2 intensity for each international
and intra-national trade flow in the global economy. The tariff data are even more detailed, with 200
million tariff measures that uniquely describe each origin×destination×industry. I obtain qualitatively
similar results from several other datasets and sensitivity analyses.
Why have countries imposed more protection on clean than dirty industries? Theory and evidence
suggest that countries do not explicitly consider CO2 or intend to subsidize it in choosing trade policy;
indeed, I believe that countries are not even aware of the subsidy this paper highlights, since previous
literature has not tested for or identified it. Instead, this paper proposes that some forces which determine
trade policy are correlated with CO2 intensity.
To determine which forces account for the association between trade policy and CO2 intensity, the
analysis considers explanations based on 20 variables suggested by theoretical and empirical research.
These explanations include optimal tariffs (inverse export supply elasticities), lobbying expenditures,
unionization, labor and capital shares, declining or “sunset” industries, worker wages and education, firm
size, industry concentration rates, intra-industry trade, levels and trend in trade exposure, dispersion
in firm sizes and in firm locations, shipping costs, unemployment, “local” pollutants like sulfur dioxide,
and an industry’s upstream location. These variables are available for the U.S.; a subset is available for
all countries. To address the potential endogeneity, some specifications instrument a particular political
economy explanation (e.g., mean wages in a specific industry) with its value from the ten other smallest
countries in the data. I focus on the ten smallest other countries since they are more likely to take
conditions in the rest of the world as given. I discuss though do not find support for explanations based
on production efficiency (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971).
Among these potential explanations, linear regressions and a machine learning algorithm highlight
an industry’s location or “upstreamness” in global value chains as accounting for a large share of the
association between CO2 intensity and trade policy. The analysis measures upstreamness as the economic
distance of each industry from final consumers (Antra`s et al. 2012). More upstream industries have both
lower protection and greater emissions.
I investigate one political economy explanation for the covariance of upstreamness and trade policy
involving lobbying competition. Firms may lobby for high tariffs and NTBs on their own outputs, but
also lobby for low tariffs on their the goods they use directly and indirectly as inputs, so as to decrease
production costs.2 Because final consumers are poorly organized (Olson 1965), politicians give the least
2Firms publicly emphasize this rationale. When President Trump initially proposed tariffs on steel, the American Automotive
Policy Council announced, “The auto industry and the U.S. workers that the industry employs would be adversely affected
and that [sic] this unintended negative impact would exceed the benefit provided to the steel industry” (Gibson 2017). The
Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC), a twenty-year old U.S. lobby group focused on decreasing tariffs on
upstream industries, experienced a doubling of membership during a “Stand up to Steel” campaign, and supported a bill in
the U.S. House of Representatives (HR 2770) to give steel consumers greater standing in trade cases. When President Obama
imposed tariffs on Chinese tires, CITAC responded, “[W]e believe that this case will undermine the jobs of many more US
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protection to the upstream industries (which are also the dirtiest) and the greatest protection to the most
downstream industries (which are also the cleanest).
A partial equilibrium back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that this global subsidy to CO2 emis-
sions totals $550 to $800 billion dollars per year. This can be interpreted as revenue that a carbon tariff
would collect if it had the same pattern as trade policy’s environmental bias (i.e., -$85/ton to -$120/ton).
I then use a set of general equilibrium models to assess how counterfactual trade policies would affect
CO2 emissions and social welfare. These analyses use strong assumptions that of course provide a very
imperfect approximation of reality. I first provide analytical results from a simple two-country, two-good
model. In a simple version, increasing trade costs for dirty goods decreases global emissions, especially
when baseline trade in dirty goods is common and when demand is elastic.
I then use a many-industry, many-country general equilibrium model with several common features—input-
output links, trade imbalances, CO2 emissions from fossil fuel, trade imbalances, tariffs that are lump-sum
rebated, and NTBs (Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare 2014; Caliendo and Parro 2015; Eaton et al. 2016;
Shapiro 2016). I study six sets of counterfactual policies. In the first, each country sets a single tariff per
trading partner which applies to all industries, and which equals the country’s mean baseline bilateral
tariff. Each country implements a similar reform for NTBs. This counterfactual decreases global CO2
emissions while leaving global real income unchanged or slightly increased. It has similar magnitude
effects on CO2 as two of the world’s largest actual or proposed climate change policies, the EU Emissions
Trading System and the U.S. Waxman-Markey Bill. In the second counterfactual, only the EU adopts
this policy. One could think of this as a way for the EU to address leakage from its CO2 cap-and-trade
market, the EU Emissions Trading System. This decreases global CO2 emissions by half the amount of
the global policy, and again leaves global real income unchanged or slightly higher.
The third and fourth counterfactuals find that changing tariffs and NTBs to equal either the base-
line level of the cleanest third or dirtiest third of industries decreases global CO2 emissions by several
percentage points. Fifth, I consider a counterfactual in which every country adds a tariff proportional to
goods’ CO2 intensity, i.e., a carbon tariff. This has modest environmental benefits. Finally, if countries
completely eliminated tariffs and NTBs, both global CO2 emissions and real income would rise. Although
turning off trade policy by definition eliminates trade policy’s environmental bias, the resulting increase
in income dwarfs this effect.
This paper has potentially important policy implications. In a first-best setting where every country
implemented uniform carbon prices on all CO2 emissions, trade policy would have no role in efficient
climate policy. In a second-best setting where political economy constraints make optimal climate change
policy infeasible, considering environmental concerns in designing trade policy could potentially increase
welfare. But in either setting, a trade policy which subsidizes CO2 may be inefficient, and hence limiting
the greater protection of clean relative to dirty goods could increase welfare. I believe this type of policy,
which considers the CO2 intensity of an industry in negotiating bilateral or multilateral trade policy
workers in downstream industries...” (Business Wire 2009).
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across industries but without a formal carbon tariff, has not been discussed in government or academia.3
Such reforms may appeal to groups that typically disagree – dirty industries and environmentalists –
because they can maintain protection of dirty domestic industries (at least relative to clean industries)
while decreasing global CO2 emissions. More broadly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has sought
to decrease protection of downstream relative to upstream industries, since such trade policy reforms
would let developing countries sell more advanced technologies to industrialized countries. This paper
suggests that such WTO goals may also help address climate change.
Several caveats are worth noting. This paper refers to the higher tariff and NTB rates on clean
relative to dirty goods as an implicit “subsidy” to CO2 emissions. This “subsidy” refers to a lower
tax rate in a setting where most goods face positive taxes (tariffs and NTBs). This difference in trade
policy may encourage countries to purchase more clean goods domestically and dirty goods from abroad;
internationally traded goods within an industry are more CO2-intensive both because they require long-
distance transportation and because they tend to be outsourced to countries like China and India that
rely heavily on coal for production and so are CO2-intensive (Shapiro 2016). The difference in trade
policy also encourages firms and final consumers to substitute from consuming cleaner to dirtier goods
(e.g., substituting from aluminum to steel). For these reasons and since the quantitative analysis finds
that the difference in trade policy between clean and dirty industries increases global CO2 emissions, I
refer to this difference in trade policy as a “subsidy.” This is a global subsidy—for example, if France
imposes low import tariffs on dirty goods, this may increase CO2 emissions from French trading partners
and from the globe overall, though could decrease these emissions from within France.
It is also worth discussing the implications of using a second-best tool like trade policy as an alternative
or complement to traditional environmental taxes on production or consumption. Important debates have
considered the merits of taxing pollution through trade policy (e.g., Kortum and Weisbach 2016). One
point of this paper is that current trade policy is subsidizing pollution for political economy (not efficiency)
reasons, which no theoretical or empirical arguments claim is efficient.
This paper builds on several literatures. I believe this paper is the first to report the association
of tariffs or NTBs with the pollution emitted to produce different goods, and the first to quantify the
environmental consequences of harmonizing trade policy between clean and dirty goods. Research on
trade and the environment asks how hypothetical changes in aggregate trade flows affect pollution, studies
hypothetical carbon tariffs, or investigates how environmental policies and attributes of industries affect
trade flows though not trade policies (Antweiler 1996; Copeland and Taylor 2003; Frankel and Rose 2005;
Fowlie et al. 2016; Shapiro and Walker 2018). A large literature studies the consequences of hypothetical
carbon border tax adjustments, relying primarily on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and
largely or completely abstracting from existing patterns of tariffs or NTBs. An entire field of academia,
industrial ecology, quantifies the pollution required to produce internationally traded goods. Research
3Such reforms are likely feasible within WTO regulations. The WTO does not primarily regulate NTBs, so most changes
in NTBs are permissible. WTO members negotiate maximum (“binding”) tariffs on trading partners. The binding tariffs do
constrain the maximum possible level, but WTO members have flexibility in choosing tariffs below those levels through bilateral
or multilateral agreements.
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in industrial ecology and economics measures pollution embodied in traded goods (e.g., Antweiler 1996;
Davis and Caldeira 2010; Aichele and Felbermayr 2012). None of this work compares its measures of
pollution embodied in traded goods against actual current levels of tariffs or NTBs.
This paper also introduces tariffs and NTBs as a new setting to study political economy and the
environment. Research on the political economy of environmental policy is limited. Some work does use
Grossman and Helpman (1994)’s “Protection for Sale” model to study domestic environmental policy
(Fredriksson 1997; Schleich and Orden 2000). Trade policy provides an appealing setting to study po-
litical economy and the environment because it governs the more than 20 percent of CO2 that crosses
international borders embodied in traded goods, substantially affects pollution, creates easily-observed
tax rates that vary across industries and countries, and depends on political economy forces like lobbying.
This paper also builds on an older trade policy literature by providing the first nonparametric evidence
of “tariff escalation” – the phenomenon that more processed goods face higher tariffs – using continuous
measures of upstreamness; the first evidence of NTB escalation, which is important since NTBs create
a larger trade barrier than tariffs in industrialized countries; and the first empirical link between tariff
escalation and the environment. Corden (1966, p. 228) in the Journal of Political Economy described
tariff escalation as “so well known that detailed substantiation is hardly needed.” Research on tariff
escalation has since become uncommon, despite renewed interest in global value chains. While the
existing literature generally identifies tariff escalation by reporting three mean tariff rates, for “primary,”
“intermediate,” and “consumer goods” (Balassa 1965; Golub and Finger 1979; Marvel and Ray 1983),
I propose that upstreamness provides a natural and continuous measure to use for studying escalation.
Upstreamness is also related to the explanation for tariff escalation that upstream industries may lobby
for low tariffs on their intermediate inputs (Cadot et al. 2004; Gawande et al. 2012). I am not aware
of prior work interpreting tariff escalation through the full measure of upstreamness, though Gawande
et al. (2012) relate it to the simpler measure of the share of an industry’s output sold as intermediates. I
show that upstreamness is more strongly associated with tariffs or NTBs than are most other standard
explanations for trade policy. The most relevant recent other parts of the trade policy literature link
trade policy to global value chains (Antra`s and Staiger 2012; Blanchard et al. 2016) and link trade policy
to other domains like the environment (Copeland 2000; Maggi 2016).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 the econometrics. Section
4 discusses the relationship between pollution intensity and trade policy. Section 5 evaluates political
economy explanations. Section 6 evaluates consequences of counterfactual reforms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
I combine data on three types of variables: trade policy, pollution emissions, and political economy.
Unless otherwise noted, all data represent a cross-section for the year 2007 (which is the year Exiobase
covers) or the closest available year. I show some estimates with multiple years of U.S. data. Online
Appendix A.1 discusses concordance files.
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2.1 Trade Policy
Tariffs are the most easily-quantified trade policy instrument, but NTBs are increasing in importance.
I obtain data on tariff rates from the Market Access Map (Macmap) database. A 2-digit Harmonized
System (HS) code version of these data is freely available online. I purchased the 6-digit HS code version
from the French Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations (CEPII) (Guimbard et al. 2012). The
data provide the most comprehensive tariff records available. The data distinguish 5,000 different goods
(6-digit Harmonized System codes) for 190 countries and account for most-favored nation tariffs, regional
trade agreements, free trade agreements, customs unions, and tariff-rate quotas. The data cover all
bilateral trading partners.
For tariffs on U.S. imports, I use records from the Census Bureau’s Imports of Merchandise files. While
Macmap lists statutory tariff rates (i.e., official policy), Census records list tariff duties actually paid, so
permit calculation of effective tariff rates. As the many types of tariffs in the Macmap database illustrate,
accurately interpreting tariff schedules and their exemptions is complex and can introduce measurement
error; observing statutory tariffs, as in the U.S., avoids this complexity. The U.S. data are reported at the
level of a 10-digit Harmonized System (HS) code, and I use a version linked to six-digit North American
Industrial Classification System codes (NAICS; see Schott 2008). I calculate U.S. effective import tariff
rates as the total duty collected, divided by the cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) value of trade.
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) include policy barriers to trade that are not tariffs, such as price regulations,
product standards, quantity restrictions like quotas, or others.4 I use data from Kee et al. (2009) on the
dollar (i.e., ad valorem) equivalent of NTBs; they describe how they calculate these values from raw data
in the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) system. These NTB values are calculated
for each 6-digit HS code, for a year around 2000-2003 (the exact year varies across countries), and for
about 100 countries. The World Bank has been working to update the NTB data, though the more recent
data are not complete or available for research. I interpret these NTBs as applying to all international
trade, including between EU countries (Chen and Novy 2012). The NTB data exclude five countries
that are separately distinguished in Exiobase and WIOD, so I exclude these from the analysis—Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Malta, Slovak Republic, and Taiwan. I do not use data on other trade policy instruments since
they are not readily available for all countries, though Bond et al. (2019) find some evidence of links
between upstreamness and protection using data on export tax equivalents of China’s value added tax
rebates.
4A global social planner might set tariff rates to zero, since tariffs largely exist for political economy or terms-of-trade reasons.
A global planner might set some NTBs to non-zero rates, since some NTBs could address market failures in health, safety, or
the environment. I abstract from efficiency rationales for NTBs in part since I am not aware of data distinguishing the extent to
which each country and industry’s NTBs are efficient versus reflect rent-seeking and protectionism. It is generally believed that
NTB rates have risen in recent decades partly in response to decreased tariff rates, which would suggest that NTBs primarily
represent protection rather than correction of market failures.
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2.2 CO2 Emissions
I first explain my approach to measuring CO2 emissions informally for one closed economy, then explain
it formally, then discuss multiple open countries, and finally describe data sources.
Consider two types of CO2 emissions. First, an industry burns fossil fuels to produce output. Second,
an industry purchases intermediate goods as inputs that themselves require CO2 emissions to produce.
I describe the first channel as “direct” CO2 emissions and the second as “indirect.” An input-output
table for one country contains one row per industry and one column per industry. Each value in the
table represents the dollars of output from an industry in a row required to produce a dollar of output
of the industry indicated in a column. This permits calculation of direct CO2 emissions, since it shows
how many dollars of coal, oil, and natural gas are required to produce a dollar of output in each other
industry. To calculate direct CO2 emissions, I consider the rows for the coal extraction, oil extraction,
and natural gas extraction industries. The analysis uses independent data on the national price per
physical unit of each fossil fuel and on the physical emissions rate (i.e., the tons of CO2 emitted per ton
of coal, barrel of oil, or cubic foot of natural gas burned). Multiplying these coal, oil, and gas input
expenditures by the tons of CO2 emitted per dollar of fossil fuel burned gives the direct emissions rate.
This approach to using an input-output matrix to account for pollution is standard (Miller and Blair
2009, p. 447) and resembles what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change calls the “Tier 1”
or “default” method of calculating CO2 emissions. It is designed to measure emissions from producing
goods, which is appropriate for an analysis of tariffs on internationally traded goods.5
This approach can calculate direct but not indirect emissions. For example, the emissions rate for
cookware in this approach reflects fossil fuels burned to shape steel into a pan (which are listed in the
cookware industry column) but not fossil fuels used to make the steel in the first place (which are listed
in the steel industry column or its input industries like electricity). As shown formally below, inverting
the input-output matrix permits calculation of total emissions, which equal the sum of direct and indirect
emissions. This inverse indicates the dollars of coal, oil, and natural gas required to produce a dollar of
output in each industry, including the coal, oil, and natural gas embodied in intermediate goods, and
inputs to intermediates, and inputs to these inputs, etc. Environmental economists call this a “life cycle”
measure of emissions; international economists call it a “value chain” measure.
Continuing this explanation for a single closed economy, let S denote the number of industries in the
economy and let A be an S×S input-output table where each row lists the industry supplying inputs and
each column lists the industry demanding outputs. Each entry in the matrix A describes the dollars of
input from the industry in a given row required to produce a dollar of output for the industry in a given
column. Let x be an S × 1 column vector describing each industry’s gross output and let d be an S × 1
vector of final demand, including exports. An accounting identity states that each industry’s gross output
equals the value of its output used for intermediate goods in all industries plus the value of its output
5One could also wonder how domestic or “behind-the-border” policies affect the choice among energy-consuming durable
goods like cars or air conditioners. While Section 4.2 discusses sensitivity analyses designed to account for energy used in
consuming these goods, a detailed analysis of energy consumption for these goods and associated policies is the topic of an active
body of research that uses models specialized to these sectors (e.g., Bento et al. 2009; Jacobsen et al. 2019).
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used for final demand: x = Ax+ d. Simple algebra then reveals the total amount of intermediate inputs
(including both direct and indirect inputs) required to produce a dollar of final demand: x = (I−A)−1d.
The matrix (I −A)−1 is called the Leontief inverse or the matrix of total requirements. It describes the
dollars of each input, including those required to produce intermediate inputs, and inputs to inputs, etc.
required to produce an additional dollar of final demand.
I apply this approach to calculate emissions rates for a dollar of final demand in each industry. I focus
on CO2 from fossil fuel combustion since it accounts for most greenhouse gas emissions and uses the
most accurate methods. A sensitivity analysis obtains qualitatively similar results from the additional
main greenhouse gases (methane and nitrous oxide), and emissions from processes that are not fossil
fuel combustion. This approach does not account for changes in CO2 emissions from goods that are
complementary with or substitutes for the good of interest, which may be most relevant for energy-
consuming durable goods like vehicles or housing.
Extending this approach to multiple open countries and industries is straightforward. Let N denote
the number of countries. In a multi-region input-output table, A is an NS×NS matrix, where each row
is a specific country×industry and each column is a specific country×industry. For example, one table
entry might show the dollars of Chinese steel (one row) required to produce a dollar of U.S. cookware
(one column). Then x and d are NS × 1 column vectors describing gross output and final demand,
respectively. Using a multi-region input-output table, the rest of the analysis proceeds as above.
Measuring CO2 emissions from an input-output table can involve several pitfalls. One pitfall is
that using the average national price of a fossil fuel assumes that all industries face this price. Input-
output tables measure expenditures in currency (e.g., dollar) terms, while CO2 emissions are in physical
quantities (metric tons of CO2). The data on CO2 emissions use the mean national price of each fossil
fuel (e.g., dollars per ton of coal) to translate from currency to quantities. Emission rates (e.g., tons of
CO2 emitted per ton of coal) are then used to translate from quantities of fossil fuels to quantities of CO2.
Bulk discounts, transportation costs, market power, and other forces can make fossil fuel prices differ
across industries. Another potential pitfall is that one fossil fuel can vary in its CO2 intensity—different
varieties of coal, for example, have modestly different CO2 emitted per ton of coal. Additionally, some
fossil fuels are physically transformed into products (“feedstocks”), rather than being burned, such as
crude oil transformed into plastic. Moreover, input-output tables abstract from heterogeneity within a
country×industry—large firms, or firms that export to specific destinations, can have different emissions
than the average firm (Lyubich et al. 2018).
I address these pitfalls in a few ways. I address heterogeneity in fossil fuel prices and CO2 rates in
part by constructing instrumental variables for CO2 rates, described below. I address feedstocks by using
measures of CO2 intensity from Exiobase that exclude fossil fuels used for feedstocks. I abstract from
heterogeneity in emission rates within a country×industry.
I am not aware of approaches besides the use of input-output tables that can measure emission rates
from all industries and countries, and particularly to account for emissions embodied in intermediate
goods. National surveys of firms can measure emission rates directly; as described below, I use one
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such survey for the U.S., and it does not substantially change estimates. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) describes two other approaches to measuring CO2—“Tier 2” uses country-specific
data on emission factors and other variables, and “Tier 3” uses country-specific specialized engineering
models and location specific data that are tailored to national circumstances. Because it is country-
specific, Tier 3 is difficult to use for comparisons across all countries and industries, and I am not aware
of data for all countries and industries using the Tier 2 approach.
An example may clarify what this approach does and does not measure. The emission rate for
the vehicle manufacturing industry includes the coal, oil, and natural gas burned to produce the steel,
rubber, engine, and assembly of the vehicle, and transportation of the components between the respective
manufacturing plants. The emissions rate for vehicle manufacturing does not account for combustion of
goods like gasoline that are complements or substitutes for manufactured vehicles. I report sensitivity
analyses which adjust the emission rate for energy-consuming durable goods like cars to account for the
energy services used to operate them.
Several data sources help measure CO2 emissions. The main dataset is Exiobase, which combines
trade data, input-output tables, and national accounts to construct a global multi-region input-output
table. Exiobase reports the direct CO2 emissions per million Euros of output for every country×industry.
To construct data on CO2 emissions per country×industry, Exiobase primarily uses emissions data from
the International Energy Agency (IEA 2007a,b,c). I use Exiobase’s calculated CO2 emissions from fossil
fuel combustion for each country×industry. I convert Euros to dollars using the mean annual exchange
rate from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and deflate to 2016 dollars using the U.S. GDP
deflator. The main Exiobase sample is restricted to observations with non-missing tariffs, NTBs, and
CO2 rates. Online Appendix A.2 provides additional details on Exiobase.
I then calculate total (direct+indirect) emissions rates from Exiobase as follows. Let Lijst denote
an entry of the Leontief inverse L = (I − A)−1, i.e., the dollars of output from industry s in country i
required to produce one dollar of output from industry t in country j, including the entire global value
chain (inputs, inputs to inputs, etc.). Let Edirectis be the direct emissions from producing a dollar of output
from country i in industry s, i.e., the CO2 emitted from the coal, oil, and natural gas used directly in
this country×industry. Exiobase reports Edirectis . Then the total emissions rate is Ejt =
∑
i,s LijstE
direct
is .
I report separate results using U.S. data primarily for data quality reasons—the U.S. provides a second
and independent measure of CO2 emissions, provides greater industry detail (around 350 NAICS 6-digit
industries), reports effective and not just statutory tariff rates, and generally provides higher-quality
and better-documented data. The U.S.-only analysis uses U.S. data for both tariffs and CO2 emissions,
and therefore implicitly assumes that emissions rates in other countries are the same as in the U.S. The
global analysis does not make this assumption. Online Appendix A.5 describes additional data used to
measure U.S. CO2 emissions. This approach relying on the U.S. data is more similar to how the Waxman-
Markey bill, which passed the U.S. House but not the Senate in 2009, and other U.S. CO2 cap-and-trade
proposals would measure CO2 emissions for border tax adjustments. Some also argue that measuring
CO2 emissions for a carbon border adjustment from domestic emission rates rather than from the CO2
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content of imports would have a stronger legal basis at the WTO (Staiger 2018). At the same time, this
strong assumption of the U.S.-only analysis is important to bear in mind.
2.3 Political Economy Explanations
Why do different industries face different trade policies, or any trade policy at all? One explanation
involves optimal tariffs and the terms of trade—a large country can privately benefit by imposing small
import tariffs on its trading partners. In this classic explanation, a country’s privately optimal tariff
equals the inverse of the foreign export supply elasticity it faces (Bickerdike 1907). Optimal tariffs could
correlate with CO2 intensity, since optimal tariffs are higher on more differentiated industries, and clean
industries may be more differentiated.
The second set of theories involves political economy. The more influential of these theories focus on
organized interest groups (Olson 1965; Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1995; Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
1998, 2007). Organized industries can provide campaign contributions to politicians, hire lobbyists,
organize media campaigns, and in other ways use centralized organization to obtain trade protection.
Politicians may find it privately optimal to distort trade policy in response to this lobbying, but in most
settings a social planner would not. This simplifies the analysis somewhat, as the welfare cost of changing
trade policy equals the change in the gains from trade plus the change in trade policy’s environmental
consequences. Apart from justifications for some NTBs, which I mention earlier, market failures do not
typically justify trade policy.
Empirical analogues to these political economy explanations come from a range of studies and data
sources. Some political economy variables are available separately for each country×industry in Exiobase;
I extract these variables and use them for the global analysis. A larger set of political economy variables
are available from U.S. data; I use these data to analyze the U.S. only. The introduction lists each
variable; Online Appendix A.3 describes measurement of each variable and their data sources. I choose
variables to include following existing empirical trade policy research (Pincus 1975; Caves 1976; Anderson
1980; Ray 1981; Marvel and Ray 1987; Trefler 1993; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007; Freund and C¸aglar
O¨zden 2008), especially Rodrik (1995).
Because it is particularly relevant to this paper’s setting, I add a measure of “local” air pollution
emissions and damages not discussed in the trade literature. Firms’ emissions of air pollutants, in
addition to emissions of pollution through water, land, and other media, create local external costs.
These externalities could lead to policies like low tariffs and NTBs on dirty industries which seek to
relocate polluting activity to other countries.6
I discuss the one variable here which turns out to be the most important. I measure each industry’s
“upstreamness” as the average economic distance of an industry from final use. One can also interpret
upstreamness as the mean position of an industry’s output in a vertical production chain (Antra`s and
6Another interpretation is that many regions impose domestic local zoning restrictions that relocate dirty production from
richer to poorer areas. Similarly, imposing low tariffs and NTBs on dirty goods could reflect wealthy countries’ efforts to relocate
dirty production to poor countries.
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Chor 2013) or as the share of an industry’s output sold to relatively upstream industries (Fally 2012). If
industry i is measured to be more upstream than industry j, this does not imply that industry i actually
supplies industry j. Rather, this simply implies that industry i on average is further in economic distance
from final consumers than industry j is. Online Appendix A.3 presents the formal equation used to
measure upstreamness and discusses its measurement.
2.4 Tariffs On Intermediate Versus Final Goods
I discuss one exercise that may both provide insight on data quality and a public good for research. Some
research defines tariffs on intermediate and final goods based on a United Nations Broad Economic Codes
(BEC) classification of roughly a dozen broad industry codes into materials, intermediate inputs, and
consumer goods (Mishra and Spilimbergo 2011; Amiti et al. 2014; Brandt et al. 2017).
The data in this paper allow an alternative approach. For each source country in Exiobase, I define
the third of industries that are most upstream as “intermediate goods” and the third of industries that
are least upstream as “final goods.” For each destination country (importer), I then calculate the mean
tariff on “intermediate goods” and the mean tariff on “final goods.” I separately calculate weighted and
unweighted averages. An advantage of this approach is that it defines intermediate and final good tariffs
based on input-output links between industries, rather than on written industry titles. In case these
data are useful for other research, I have posted them, along with the associated BEC averages, online
at http://joseph-s-shapiro.com/data.html.
My and the BEC definitions obtain similar mean tariffs—mean weighted tariffs for intermediate goods
are 2.3 and 2.6 percent in my and the BEC measures, respectively; and tariffs for final goods are 6.5 and
6.3 percent. My measure has more dispersion – tariffs have a standard deviation of 8.8 versus 7.0 percent
– in part since Exiobase allows more detailed industry codes than the BEC, and since the set of which
industries are upstream varies slightly across countries in my approach but not in the BEC classification.
In a dataset where each observation is an importer×industry (with two industries, “intermediate” and
“final”), a regression of my tariff measure on the BEC measure and a constant obtains a regression
coefficient of 0.75 (robust standard error 0.11) in levels or 1.28 (0.11) in logs.
3 Econometrics
3.1 Trade Policy and CO2 Intensity
To measure differences in trade policy between clean and dirty industries, I estimate the following:
tjs = αEjs + µj + js (1)
The dependent variable t is the mean import tariff rate or ad valorem NTBs that destination country
j imposes on goods in industry s. In the global data, s represents the foreign industry which produced
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the good, not the domestic industry which consumed it. For example, the emissions rate E for Mexican
imports of steel reflects the mean emissions from steel production in all countries from which Mexico
imports, while the tariffs t reflects Mexico’s import tariffs on steel. Equation (1) has a j rather than
both i and j subscript because the analyses averages across origin countries (weighted by the value of
each trade flow) for three reasons: this enhances comparability between tariffs and NTBs, since the latter
are defined only by destination country and industry; this helps address the presence of zero trade flows
between some origin×destination×industry tuples; and this increases comparability of these regressions
with political economy variables, which are observed at the country×industry level. I show some results
with separate observations for each exporter×importer×industry (i× j × s) tuple.
The main explanatory variable, E, represents the tons of CO2 emitted per dollar of imported good.
As discussed earlier, E is calculated from inverting an input-output table, so includes both direct CO2
emissions, which are those emitted from industry s, and indirect emissions, which are those emitted from
industries used as inputs to industry s, and inputs to inputs, etc.7
The destination country fixed effect µj implies that this regression compares trade policy across
industries within a country. The thought experiment is a country applying similar trade policy on dirty
and clean goods. This counterfactual fits the political economy of choosing trade policy, which is made
by national authorities. I also show sensitivity analyses without these fixed effects. The idiosyncratic
error  contains all unmodeled determinants of import tariff rates.
Equation (1) allows a useful interpretation: the parameter α represents the carbon tariff implicit in
existing trade policy. The regression has this interpretation because t is measured in dollars of tariff
duties (or NTB equivalent) per dollar of imports and E is measured in tons of CO2 per dollar of imports.
Therefore α represents duties collected per ton of CO2 emitted.
8 For example, α = 40 would imply that
an additional $40 of import duties (or NTB ad valorem equivalent) is collected for each additional ton
of CO2 embodied in a good. My finding of α ≈ −85 to −120 implies that current trade policy embodies
a carbon subsidy in trade policy of 85 to 120 dollars per ton of CO2. As mentioned in the introduction,
I refer to this as a “subsidy” in part because it represents a lower tax rate for traded dirty goods, even
though it occurs in a setting where most traded goods face positive taxes.
Equation (1) does not estimate a causal effect of CO2 intensity on tariffs. Rather, it is a descriptive
regression showing the covariance of carbon intensity and trade policy within each country, and so recovers
7Formally, Ejs = (
∑
i6=j,tEijstXijst)/
∑
i6=j,tXijst, where Eijst is the emissions rate from inverting the global input-output
table, and Xijst is the value of the trade flow from origin country i and origin industry s to destination country j and destination
industry t. The summation excludes i = j because the emissions rate relevant for carbon tariffs and international trade applies
only to international imports, not to intra-national trade. The emissions rate Eijst differs by importer×exporter×industry. For
example, the emissions rate for U.S. steel imports from China differs from the emissions rate for U.S. steel imports from Canada.
These emissions rates differ because China and Canada use different fossil fuel inputs, both directly and indirectly.
8Imports appear to be in the denominator of both the left- and right- hand sides of equation (1), which could produce spurious
correlation. In practice in the global data, as Section 2.1 explains, t is measured as statutory tariffs (or NTB equivalents). Hence, t
reflects published regulations about which tariff rate applies to different types of products, and t is not measured through dividing
data on duties collected by data on imports. In the U.S. data, t equals duties collected divided by imports. But as Section 2.2
explains, in the U.S. data, E equals emissions from a U.S. industry’s production of CO2 (including life cycle CO2) divided by
the industry’s gross output. Additionally, the U.S. value of E from the input-output table is instrumented with its value from
the direct survey MECS. Hence, the measurement of these variables in data limits the scope for bias from spurious correlation.
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the carbon tariff implicit in trade policy. As discussed earlier, Section 5 develops the interpretation that
underlying political economy forces determine tariffs as a function of variables that are omitted from
equation (1); these forces are correlated with CO2 intensity.
In equation (1), trade policy t is the dependent variable and the emissions rate E is the independent
variable, for three reasons: this fits with the theoretical interpretation that an industry’s emissions rate
is correlated with other political determinants of trade policy; this allows empirical tests of whether the
coefficient α represents correlation of CO2 with omitted political economy variables that determine trade
policy; and this allows the coefficient α to be interpreted as the implicit carbon tariff.
Alternatively, one could consider the reverse regression of the emissions rate E on the level of trade
policy t. I also show some results using this reverse regression. Trade policy could potentially affect
emissions intensities, either through changing import shares (e.g., affecting emissions embodied in in-
termediate goods) or through affecting productivity (via reallocation, entry, etc.). Some evidence for
individual country liberalization episodes suggests that trade liberalization affects plant-level emissions
of air or climate change pollution (Martin 2011; Cherniwchan 2017), though I am not aware of any direct
evidence on how trade policy systematically affects emissions rates of global bilateral trade flows, which
would an interesting subject for for future research.
Most regressions are clustered by industry. I also report some results with standard errors clustered
by importer. For the U.S.-only analysis, where each observation is an industry, clustering by industry is
equivalent to reporting robust standard errors.
The main estimates in the paper, including those of equation (1), include only observations for man-
ufacturing. This makes the global and U.S. data consistent, since the U.S. MECS data are only available
for manufacturing, and is consistent with much of the trade literature. The measure of total CO2 in-
tensity in all these analysis accounts for emissions embodied in intermediate goods from all sectors, not
just manufacturing. I report sensitivity analyses that also include other tradable goods (agriculture and
mining).
Most literature using global multi-region input-output tables abstracts from measurement error. This
paper discusses potential bias from measurement error and reports alternative results that may help
address it. Measuring CO2 intensity from an input-output table may involve two types of measurement
error. The first is potentially relevant to all analysis with input-output tables—the input-output table
itself has errors-in-variables. Constructing an input-output table requires judgments of analysts from
national statistical agencies and adjustment through linear programming (Horowitz and Planting 2006).
Second, prices paid for each fossil fuel vary by industry, and input-output tables lack data on such
industry-specific input prices. Both types of measurement error could attenuate OLS estimates of α.
To address potential measurement error in measures of CO2 intensity, I use direct emissions as an
instrumental variable for total emissions. The first-stage regression is
Ejs = βE
direct
js + µj + ηjs (2)
The second stage is equation (1). Here Ejs measures total (direct+indirect) emissions from the input-
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output table and Edirectjs measures direct emissions. Direct emissions reflect fossil fuels used in industry s
but not fossil fuels embodied in intermediate goods used in industry s. For example, the direct emissions
for producing a car include the natural gas used to heat and weld the car parts together at the car factory
but not the coal used to produce steel that is then shipped to the car factory.
The instrument is only designed to address attenuation bias due to measurement error. Omitted
variables and reverse causality are not problems here because this descriptive analysis estimates the
covariance of CO2 intensity and trade policy within each country, not a causal effect of CO2 intensity.
9
First-stage regressions and the associated F statistics can test whether this instrument is strong. Because
direct emissions constitute a large part of total emissions, this instrument is likely to be strong.
Because this instrument is designed to address measurement error, the main question for validity is
whether any measurement error in direct and total emissions is independent. If so, then this instrument
can eliminate attenuation bias due to measurement error. If not, then the IV estimates may be biased
towards the OLS (i.e., the IV estimates will still suffer from attenuation bias, though less than OLS).
For the U.S. data, this instrument may help correct measurement error since the instrument is built
from a separate dataset, MECS, which measures physical fossil fuel consumption separately by industry.
Documentation of U.S. input-output tables does not mention MECS (Horowitz and Planting 2006).
In the global data, the instrument still may help address potential measurement error, but because
direct and total emissions are measured from the same dataset, the instrument’s validity is not certain.
Many countries’ industrial surveys collect plant-level data on electricity and fossil fuel expenditures,
which suggests that input-output tables may measure direct emissions with limited measurement error.
Usually, these surveys just ask about total expenditures on “materials” without disaggregating by sourc-
ing industry, which suggests they may less accurately measure total emissions. Additionally, energy is
typically purchased from a limited number of suppliers (in some countries, state-owned firms), and many
countries survey these suppliers. At the same time, the instrument in the global data may not completely
eliminate measurement error. The instrument is the direct emissions rate in the 10 smallest other coun-
tries. The validity of such leave-out instruments can be less clear than the validity of some other types of
instruments, in part due to concerns about the reflection problem (Manski 1993). Due to the possibility
that measurement error persists in the global estimates, the true global subsidy may be larger in absolute
value than what I estimate.
3.2 Political Economy Explanations
I then test the hypothesis that the association between trade policy and CO2 intensity reflects variables
that are omitted from equation (1) but that both determine trade policy and correlate with CO2 intensity.
I estimate linear regressions including potential variables Fjs that are believed to explain trade policy,
9Since trade policy can change trade volumes, one might wonder whether reverse causality affects the weights Xijst used to
calculate Ejs. This is not a primary concern here for two reasons. First, this does not change the descriptive interpretation of
α in equation (1) as the association between trade policy and CO2 intensity. Second, I report some results at the i× j × s level,
which do not require averaging over trading partners.
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along with CO2 intensity:
tjs = βEjs + piFjs + µj + js (3)
I estimate a separate regression for each political economy variable Fjs then assess which of these political
economy variables most attenuates the estimated covariance β between trade policy and carbon intensity.
In separate estimates, I control for all potential political economy explanations at once. I implement
this regression using both linear regression and using the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator
(Lasso), which is a common machine learning algorithm for automatic model selection (Tibshirani 1996).
Identifying which variables Lasso includes in a model can be informative though also sensitive to spec-
ification (Mullainathan and Speiss 2017). These regressions test whether each variable, including CO2
intensity, has additional explanatory power for trade policy beyond these other variables.
4 Results: Trade Policy and CO2 Intensity
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 describes the cleanest and dirtiest industries in the global data, ranked by total (direct+indirect)
CO2 emissions. Panel A shows the cleanest five industries while Panel B shows the dirtiest. Column (1)
shows mean CO2 rates across all countries, column (2) shows mean tariffs, and column (3) shows NTBs.
The cleanest five manufacturing industries primarily produce food products and have a mean global
emissions rate of 0.37 tons CO2 per thousand dollars of output. The dirtiest five manufacturing industries
mostly produce heavy goods like bricks or steel and have a mean global emissions rate of 1.88 tons CO2 per
thousand dollars of output. Motor vehicles appear relatively clean in these data (also in U.S. input-output
tables) because, as discussed earlier, most of the emissions due to vehicles come from a separate good that
is complementary, refined petroleum, and later I explore estimates accounting for this complementarity.10
It may be informative to calculate the CO2 externality these numbers imply. If each ton of CO2
emitted creates a social cost of carbon of $40 (IWG 2016), this comparison involves multiplying by
40/1000. This calculation implies that globally, pork products create a social cost from CO2 emissions of
about 1.5 percent of product value (=0.34*40/1000). Producing iron and steel creates a CO2 externality
equal to 7 percent of its product value (=1.74*40/1000).
Although Table 1 just lists ten outlier industries, its patterns preview the more general finding that
cleaner industries face more restrictive trade policy than dirty industries do. Column (2) shows that the
cleanest industries face over four times the mean tariff of the dirtiest industries, at 9 versus 2 percent.
Column (3) shows a similar difference between the cleanest and dirtiest industries for NTBs (25 versus 5
percent). I now turn to regressions analyzing all industries.
10Some developing countries directly subsidize the consumption of raw fossil fuels; trade policy also to some extent reflects
these patterns. For global trade in fossil fuel industries (coal, crude oil, natural gas, and refined petroleum), average global tariffs
are 1.7 percent and NTBs are 3.6 percent; for all other industries, these averages are 3.9 percent and 9.6 percent, respectively.
In developing countries, mean tariff and NTB rates for fossil fuels are 5.8 percent and 6.7 percent, and for all other industries
they are 7.5 percent and 9.0 percent. These values are weighted and include all industries (not only manufacturing).
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4.2 Implicit Carbon Tariffs
Tariffs
Figure 1, Panels A and B, plots hypothetical $40/ton carbon tariffs. These are not actual data, but
instead depict a proposed policy. Each point in these graphs is a separate country×industry (Panel A, all
countries) or industry (Panel B, U.S. only). The tariff rate is a constant multiple of the emissions rate,
which makes both graphs linear. In this hypothetical policy, the mean carbon tariff for all countries in
Panel B is three percent, which is slightly over half of current global mean tariff rates. The mean U.S.
carbon tariff is about four percent, which is larger than prevailing mean U.S. tariffs (Table 2).
Figure 1, Panels C and D, shows actual tariff data. In these graphs, the pattern across industries is
the opposite of hypothetical carbon tariffs. The hypothetical carbon tariffs in Panels A and B impose
higher tariffs on dirtier industries (positively sloped line), but actual tariffs in Panels C and D impose
lower tariffs on dirtier industries (negatively sloped line).
Table 2 reports regressions corresponding to these graphs. Panels A and B show estimates for the world
and U.S., respectively. Even-numbered columns are weighted by the value of the trade flow; odd-numbered
columns are not weighted. For the U.S., weighting provides an efficient response to heteroskedasticity,
since U.S. effective tariff rates equal total duties divided by total trade value. Columns (1) and (2) show
a first-stage regression of total CO2 intensity on direct CO2 intensity, corresponding to equation (2).
Columns (3) and (4) show reduced-form regressions of tariffs on direct CO2 intensity. Column (5) and
(6) show OLS regressions of tariffs on total CO2 intensity. Columns (7) and (8) report instrumental
variables regressions of tariffs on total CO2 intensity, instrumented by direct CO2 intensity.
In Table 2, Panel A, the negative signs in columns (3) through (8) imply that global tariffs have
an implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions, not a tax. Columns (7) and (8) show that the mean subsidy to
CO2 emissions in global tariffs is $11 per ton of CO2 weighted, or $32/ton unweighted. The first-stage
F-statistics show that most of the instruments are strong, though the unweighted U.S. estimates have
marginally weak instruments (F-statistic of 9.8, versus a standard cutoff of 10), and hence are possibly
biased towards OLS. The instrumental variables estimates are modestly larger than the corresponding
OLS estimates, which is consistent with attenuation bias in OLS due to measurement error, though their
qualitative results are similar.
In some settings, using instrumental variables that completely and certainly satisfy the exclusion
restriction is central to a paper’s arguments. This is not the case here, and my interpretation is that the
U.S. instrument is more likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction than the global instrument is. In part the
instruments are not critical here because they are solely designed to address measurement error, which is a
possible but no a central concern in input-output data. Little if any prior research constructs instruments
for an input-output table exclusively out of concern for measurement error. Moreover, in either the global
or U.S. analysis, the qualitative conclusions from OLS are similar to those of IV estimates. The main
conclusion from this analysis is that measurement error, if anything, means that the true global subsidies
could even be somewhat larger in absolute value than the large subsidies I estimate.
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Figure 2 shows the estimated association between CO2 intensity and tariffs for the U.S., separately
for each year of available data 1989-2017. The red circle shows the point estimate for each year and the
vertical bar shows the 95 percent confidence interval. This graph shows statistically significant negative
associations between U.S. tariffs and CO2 intensity in every year. The estimated U.S. implicit subsidy
was $13/ton in 1989, then decreased gradually to $6/ton around 1998, and remained near that value
through 2017. As Section 5 discusses, the WTO’s effort to decrease tariff escalation in the Uruguay
Round in the 1990s is one possible explanation for this trend.
Non-Tariff Barriers
Figure 1, Panels E and F, plots NTBs against CO2 emission rates. These graphs have similar structure
to the tariff graphs. They show that dirtier industries face lower NTBs in both the global and U.S. data.
Some of the cleanest industries have NTB ad valorem equivalent values close to 100 percent, while many
of the dirtiest industries face little or no NTB protection.
Table 3 reports regressions corresponding to these graphs. The table structure is similar to the tariff
regressions in Table 2. Again the numbers in columns (3) through (8) are all negative, showing a carbon
subsidy in trade policy rather than carbon tax. Columns (7) and (8) show that the implicit subsidy
to CO2 in global NTBs is $76 in the unweighted regressions or $90 in the weighted regressions. The
instrumental variables estimates in columns (7) and (8) show a large subsidy to CO2 emissions implicit
in U.S. NTBs, of about $37 to $48/ton. Summing up subsidies in tariffs from Tables 2 and NTBs from
Table 3, columns (7) and (8), gives the global subsidy that I emphasize of about $85 (weighted) to $120
(unweighted).
These implicit subsidies appear in both tariffs and NTBs but have larger magnitude in absolute value
in NTBs, perhaps in part since NTB mean values are greater. The mean U.S. ad valorem equivalent of
NTBs is 8 to 11 percent, which is over four times the mean tariff rate (Tables 2 and 3). This supports
the common claim that U.S. NTBs are more restrictive than U.S. tariffs. Globally, NTBs create a larger
barrier to trade than tariffs do, at 9 to 13 percent (NTBs) versus 3 to 5 percent (tariffs).
Implicit Subsidies, by Country
To investigate how these patterns vary by country, I sum together tariffs and the ad valorem equivalent
of NTBs as a more complete measure of protection. I then estimate equation (1) separately for each
country (hence, these regressions exclude country fixed effects).
Figure 3 plots the result. Each point in this graph describes an estimate of the implicit carbon subsidy
for one country. Each point represents the subsidy to global emissions implicit in the trade policy of one
country. The point for each country is estimated separately.11 Points on the graph are ordered by the
11Stacking the regression to account for the covariance structure across countries might increase efficiency in these estimates.
Most of the estimates are significantly different from zero, though not significantly different from each other. I view the most
striking feature of Figure 3 as the fact that even with completely separate regressions for each country, most of the country-
specific subsidies are negative and large in absolute value; stacking the regression makes the estimates no longer independent
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estimated implicit subsidy, with names shown for several countries of interest.
Almost every country in Figure 3 has a negative value, implying that most countries have a carbon
subsidy rather than a carbon tariff implicit in trade policy. European countries like France, Germany,
Norway, and the UK have among the largest such subsidies, with subsidy values exceeding $175/ton.
Russia, India, and China have smaller subsidies. The y-axis of Figure 3 shows each country’s covariance
between the trade policy an industry faces and the CO2 the industry emits. Hence, a country like China
which has high emissions due to its reliance on coal can still nonetheless have a small value in Figure 3
since its trade policies are not strongly correlated with industries’ CO2 emissions. Figure 4 plots these
data in a global map which classifies countries by their implicit subsidies.
The cross-country comparisons in Figures 3 and 4 do not follow easily predictable patterns. Large
subsidies appear in both rich regions like the EU and poor regions like Africa; small subsidies also appear
in both rich countries like Canada and poorer countries like Vietnam. Oil-intensive countries like Saudi
Arabia and Iran have small subsidies, while countries with strict environmental policies like Norway have
large subsidies. This lack of systematic patterns is consistent with the interpretation, developed in Section
5, that these subsidies are not driven by environmental concern, but instead are due to political economy
forces which are correlated with CO2 intensity.
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Sensitivity Analyses and Extensions
Online Appendix B discusses numerous alternative estimates of these implicit carbon tariffs that are shown
in Appendix Table 1, including from a tobit, alternative approaches to inference, nonlinear specifications
of CO2 intensity, winsorizing the data, including non-manufactured goods, including intra-national trade,
separating direct and indirect emissions, including all greenhouse gases, separately accounting for CO2
emissions from consumption and not merely production (e.g., the gasoline used to power a vehicle), the
reverse regression, using WIOD, excluding manufactured agricultural and food products, and specifically
analyzing the recent trade war by focusing on recent changes in U.S. import tariffs. Most of these results
are qualitatively similar to the main estimates, though some vary in their magnitudes.
I also separately analyze subsidies to CO2 implicit in cooperative versus non-cooperative tariffs. Some
non-members of the World Trade Organization face higher tariffs not negotiated cooperatively. The tariff
data report non-cooperative tariffs for three importers—the U.S., Japan, and China. The U.S. calls these
“Column 2” tariffs; China and Japan call them “general rate” tariffs (see Online Appendix A.4).
Appendix Table 2 shows evidence of implicit carbon subsidies in both cooperative and non-cooperative
across countries.
12In unreported results, I took the estimated country-level subsidy to CO2 in trade policy plotted in Figures 3 and 4, and
regressed it on several country characteristics. This regression finds that a country’s GDP per capita, its mean tariff rate, and its
quality of environmental management are all significantly associated with larger subsidies (more negative regression coefficients).
The regression also controlled for mean NTB rates, mean CO2 emissions rates, an index of perceived country corruption, and the
country’s mean upstreamness; these other variables had marginally significant (upstreamness) or no (other controls) association
with the level of a country’s implicit subsidy. I do not show this cross-country, cross-sectional regression, which has 7 explanatory
variables and less than 50 observations, since it may be hard to interpret economically; I mention it because it provides another
way to summarize the data in Figures 3 and 4.
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tariffs. This suggests that whatever political economy force creates these implicit subsidies must operate
for both cooperative and non-cooperative policy. The U.S. has a CO2 subsidy of $4.50 to $6/ton in
cooperative tariffs and a subsidy of $60 to $80/ton in non-cooperative tariffs. Consistent with Figure 3,
China does not have a clear implicit subsidy in most of its tariffs. Japanese tariff rates are similar across
the two types of tariffs, and correspondingly, the estimated implicit CO2 subsidy in Japan is generally
similar for non-cooperative and cooperative tariffs.
5 Explanations for the Relationship Between Trade Policy
and Pollution
Why do countries impose higher tariffs and NTBs on clean than on dirty goods? Answering this question
is not needed to show that this pattern of trade policy exists or to analyze the consequences of changing
it, but I investigate this question for a few reasons. The existence of these subsidies is surprising, so
the question of why they exist is interesting. Additionally, because no prior research has tested for
or demonstrated the existence of these subsidies, explaining why they exist enhances their plausibility.
Finally, understanding why these patterns of trade policy occur may provide insight into the political
feasibility of changing them.
To investigate reasons for the relationship between trade policy and pollution, I use three approaches:
linear regressions; nonparametric regressions of trade policy on upstreamness and CO2 intensity; and a
qualitative discussion of several trade policy and public finance theories.
5.1 Explanations: Omitted Variables
Which are the most important omitted variables in regressions of trade policy on CO2 intensity? Appendix
Table 3 shows that an industry’s upstream location is likely to play an important role. The table shows
the difference in each political economy variable between “dirty” and “clean” industries (i.e., those above
and below the median CO2 intensity), separately for global and U.S. data. All political economy variables
are expressed in z-scores (i.e., I subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation). Relative to
clean industries, dirty industries are significantly more upstream, have a lower labor share, lower wages,
higher unionization rates, higher shipping costs, and higher local pollution emissions; the global data
give conflicting patterns for intra-industry trade and the import penetration ratio. While dirty industries
anecdotally have outsize political influence, dirty industries make marginally lower PAC contributions,
though PAC contributions are believed to be a very imperfect measure of lobbying influence.
Appendix Table 3 shows that the association between emissions and upstreamness is stronger than the
association between emissions and other political economy variables, in U.S. and global data. All variables
are in z-scores so have the same units. In the global data, some of the other variables are correlated with
dirtiness, but the correlations are weaker than for upstreamness. The association between emissions and
upstreamness in the global data is over four times stronger than the association between emissions and
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other political economy variables. Additionally, the regressions below imply that these other variables
have less strong direct relationships to trade policy than upstreamness.
Table 4 asks which political economy explanation is the most important omitted variable in regressions
of trade policy on CO2 intensity. It shows regressions of trade protection (tariffs+NTBs) on total CO2
intensity while controlling for one political economy variable at a time, with specification corresponding
to equation (3). Total CO2 intensity is instrumented with direct CO2 intensity. Panels A and B show
estimates for all global trade; Panel C shows U.S. estimates. Column (1) includes no controls. Columns (2)
through (6) each control for one political economy variable, observed at the level of a country×industry.
Column (2) controls for upstreamness, column (3) for intra-industry trade, column (4) for the import
penetration ratio, column (5) for the labor share, and column (6) for the mean wage.
Table 4, Panel B, uses data from the ten smallest other countries to construct instrumental variables for
the focal country×industry. These help address the possibility that some political economy explanations
are endogenous. One example would be if trade policy affects wages in a given industry and country but
not in the same industry in other countries. Analyses of agglomeration and import competition similarly
use somewhat similar instruments (Ellison et al. 2010; Autor et al. 2013; Antra`s et al. 2017).
Table 4, Panel A, column (1) restates the earlier result that the total subsidy to global CO2 emissions
implicit in global trade policy is around $120/ton. Column (2) shows that controlling for upstreamness
attenuates this estimate to $33/ton. Columns (3) through (6) show that controlling for other political
economy variables one at a time only slightly changes the estimated implicit subsidy.
Table 4, Panel B, obtains similar estimates from instrumenting each political economy variable with
its mean in the ten smallest other countries. In column (2), controlling for upstreamness eliminates the
estimated implicit subsidy—the estimated association between CO2 emissions and trade policy is -$120
(34) with no political economy controls, but $34 (39) when controlling for upstreamness. Columns (3)
through (6) show that instrumenting does not substantially change the other estimates. These estimates
have strong instruments.
Panel C finds similar patterns using U.S. data. The estimated U.S. subsidy from tariffs and NTBs
is $50 (10) per ton. Controlling for upstreamness attenuates this estimate, to $3 (10) per ton. Other
political economy controls do not substantially change the estimated subsidy.
Figure 5 graphs the U.S. estimates from Table 4, along with estimates controlling for other political
economy variables that are available for the U.S. but not all countries. Each blue circle in these graphs
is the coefficient from a regression of tariffs+NTBs on total CO2 intensity (instrumented by direct CO2
intensity), controlling for one political economy variable, and corresponding to equation (3). Each red
horizontal line shows a 95% confidence interval. The “Main Estimates” restates results from Table 4,
Panel C, column (1). Each of the other numbers controls for one additional variable. The “Firm size:
mean” entry, for example, comes from a regression that controls for the mean firm size in each industry.
Figure 5 shows that controlling for most political economy variables one-by-one produces little change
in the association of trade policy with CO2 intensity. Only one political economy explanation, upstream-
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ness, eliminates the estimated implicit subsidy, and renders it statistically indistinguishable from zero.13
Appendix Table 4 shows sensitivity analyses. Panels A, B, and C show that weighted regressions
are qualitatively similar to the unweighted versions. Controlling for upstreamness attenuates the global
estimated subsidy from -$82 to $6. The instruments are strong for upstreamness and the labor share. The
weighted estimates have weaker instruments for the other explanations, which may bias these estimates
towards the OLS values. One might wonder whether the correlation between total CO2 and upstreamness
reflects measurement error in the input-output table, since both upstreamness and total CO2 emissions
are measured from the input-output table. U.S. direct CO2 emissions are not subject to this concern,
since they are measured from completely distinct data (MECS) and not from the input-output table.
Panels D and E show that OLS estimates using direct CO2 emissions are similar to IV estimates for
total CO2 emissions. Controlling for upstreamness in column (2) attenuates the correlation between
CO2 emissions and trade protection by more than 90 percent. Again, controlling for the other political
economy variables matters much less.
Appendix Table 5 reports regressions controlling for all these political economy explanations at once.
Columns (1) through (3) show estimates for all global trade. Columns (4) and (5) show estimates for U.S.
imports only. The U.S. has data on more political economy explanations. Columns (1), (2) and (4) use
linear instrumental variables regression, while columns (3) and (5) use Lasso with instrumental variables
(Belloni et al. 2016). All these regressions instrument total CO2 intensity with direct CO2 intensity. To
ease interpretation of coefficients for the controls, I have re-scaled all except CO2 intensity to be z-scores
(i.e., subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation). I leave CO2 intensity in tons/$
rather than z-scores to facilitate comparison with other tables.
These estimates suggest that other political economy forces, and especially upstreamness, account
for an important share of the association between CO2 intensity and trade policy. These estimates find
negative associations between trade policy and CO2 intensity that are smaller than in estimates without
political economy controls. Controls attenuate the association between CO2 and trade policy to $-25 to
$-28 and render it statistically insignificant (Appendix Table 5).
All the estimates in Appendix Table 5 identify upstreamness as a strong predictor of trade policy, even
conditional on the other political economy variables. Upstreamness is the only explanation for which this
is true. Upstreamness also has large magnitude effects on trade policy. In the global data, Lasso retains
only the CO2 rate and upstreamness. In the U.S. data, Lasso retains only three variables in the selected
model: CO2 intensity, upstreamness, and shipping costs.
Figure 5 and Appendix Table 5 suggest that local pollution does not statistically account for the
association between CO2 emissions and trade policy, since controlling for local pollution emissions or
damages does not substantially change the coefficient on CO2 intensity, though does decrease its precision.
13This section’s comparison of the carbon content of goods against their upstreamness and trade policy has similarities to
Blanchard et al. (2016)’s value-added content logic that a country may choose trade policy for a good to reflect the domestic
content which is embodied in the value chain for that good. One important difference is that each country may have preference
over policy for its own domestic content embodied in traded goods. For CO2 externalities, however, it does not matter whether
the CO2 embodied in a good was originally emitted from domestic or foreign fossil fuels, since CO2 has the same effect on global
climate regardless of the location of its emission.
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Apart from these estimates, a few other reasons suggest why concern for local pollution emissions is
unlikely to explain why dirty industries face lower tariffs and NTBs. First, many policymakers actively
seek to maintain dirty industries’ domestic production and directly regulate local pollution emissions by
requiring installation of scrubbers or other technology that abates local air pollution (though not CO2).
Many local governments refer to the use of subsidies to attract manufacturers as “smokestack chasing.”
Many environmental policies contain explicit provisions to prevent relocation of dirty production, such
as carbon border tax adjustments in U.S. climate bills or free distribution of allowances in proportion
to an industry’s output in cap-and-trade markets. Hence, relocating dirty industries abroad may not
be a primary policy goal. Additionally, I am not aware of any evidence that concern for local pollution
emissions has led dirty industries to have lower tariffs or NTBs. Many trade agreements like NAFTA and
TPP have side agreements dealing with the environment. These agreements typically describe domestic
environmental regulations or monitoring investments, but not patterns of tariffs and NTBs. Many of
these actually seek to prevent the relocation of dirty industries, by barring the use of weak domestic
environmental policies to lure dirty production across borders. Moreover, this implicit subsidy appears in
most countries. Efforts to outsource local pollution would thus to some extent neutralize each other—U.S.
trade policies encourage dirty industries to relocate to other countries, but similar trade policies in other
countries encourage those industries to relocate back to the U.S.
5.2 Explanations: Empirical Reasons why Upstreamness Substantially
Accounts for Subsidies
Why is an industry’s upstreamness strongly correlated with its CO2 intensity? Using U.S. data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Appendix Figure 2 graphs the share of each industry’s revenue that
is accounted for on the production side by intermediate goods, labor expenditures, profits and taxes,
and fossil fuels. Appendix Figure 2 shows that upstream industries use a larger share of fossil fuels
than downstream industries do. For the upstream industries, nearly five percent of production costs are
devoted to fossil fuels; for the most downstream industries, less than one percent of costs are. Relative
to upstream industries, downstream industries spend relatively more on labor and intermediate goods.
Previous research has not shown these patterns but they make intuitive sense—upstream industries are
taking raw materials extracted from the ground and transforming them, while downstream industries
depend more on labor and other inputs.
Appendix Figure 2 also helps answer an important question. If downstream goods are just combina-
tions of upstream goods, why would different import tariff rates on upstream versus downstream goods
affect CO2 emissions? Imagine an economy in which upstream goods were made exclusively from coal
and downstream goods were made from upstream goods. In this hypothetical economy, upstream and
downstream goods would have the same CO2 intensity, and tariff escalation could not affect global CO2
emissions. Appendix Figure 2 shows that this hypothetical economy is misleading because downstream
industries use as inputs both upstream goods and relatively clean factors like labor. Hence, imposing high
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tariffs on downstream but not upstream goods can encourage consumers to substitute from demanding
relatively clean factors like labor to demanding relatively dirty factors like energy.
Buyers can respond to changes in trade policy in many ways, including substituting between goods,
changing total demand for an industry’s products, and changing trading partners. To what extent can
firms and consumers substitute between industries with different levels of upstreamness? Certainly in
examples, goods that are substitutes have different levels of upstreamness and CO2 intensity. For example,
steel and aluminum are likely substitutes, and in the U.S. data which have greater industry detail, steel
is both more upstream and more CO2 intensive than aluminum. To give another example, containers can
be made of metal or wood; the metal container industry is both more upstream and more CO2 intensive
in U.S. data than the wood container industry.14 More broadly, consumers can substitute between goods
in a wide array of patterns; one goal of the quantitative model in Section 6 is to analyze some of these
patterns numerically.
Figure 6 shows nonparametric local linear regressions. Each graph in this figure shows two lines.
The downward-sloping dashed blue line shows a nonparametric regression of total CO2 intensity on
upstreamness. This line shows that the most upstream industries are dirtier. The upward-sloping solid
red line shows a local linear regression of tariffs on upstreamness, which shows that the most upstream
industries have the lowest tariffs. The patterns are similar for global and U.S. data, and for tariffs
and NTBs. As mentioned earlier, previous research has not documented this systematic nonparametric
relationship between trade policy and upstreamness. In these graphs, the relationships between each of
these outcomes (CO2 intensity, tariffs) and upstreamness are somewhat linear.
Appendix Figure 3 finds similar patterns in most countries. This figure plots nonparametric rela-
tionships between CO2 intensity and upstreamness, and between trade policy (tariffs+NTBs) and up-
streamness, separately for each country in Exiobase. While this figure provides almost 50 separate small
graphs, causal inspection shows the “X”-shaped pattern that in most countries, CO2 intensity increases
somewhat steadily with upstreamness, while tariffs and NTBs decrease.
Online Appendix C informally discusses how theories of trade policy might rationalize these findings.
While a range of theories seek to explain cooperative and non-cooperative trade policy, political economy
forces like lobbying for low protection on upstream goods may play a role on most of these frameworks.
That Appendix also describes a few reasons why the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency
theorem doesn’t well account for these patterns of trade policy.
14The first example compares iron and steel mills (NAICS industry 331111) against aluminum sheet, plate, and foil manufac-
turing (NAICS industry 331315). The second example compares other metal container manufacturing (NAICS industry 332439)
against wood container and pallet manufacturing (NAICS industry 321920).
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6 Consequences of Implicit CO2 Subsidies
6.1 Partial Equilibrium Approximation
I use a few approaches to investigate the aggregate consequences of these patterns of trade policy. The
first is a partial equilibrium calculation: ∑
s
αˆXjsEjs (4)
This represents the revenue that a carbon tariff would collect if it had the same pattern as trade policy’s
environmental bias (i.e., -$85 to -$120/ton). The parameter αˆ is the implicit carbon subsidy from equation
(1).
My primary estimate of Equation (4) uses regression results from Tables 2 and 3, columns (7) and
(8). This implies that global trade policy provided an implicit subsidy of $550 to $800 billion in the year
2007 (measured in 2016 dollars). This can be calculated simply: 6.5 billion tons of CO2 are embodied in
international trade (including in intermediate goods), times $85 to $120 in subsidy per ton of CO2 traded,
gives $550 ≈ 6.5× 85 or $800 ≈ 6.5× 125.15 Appendix Table 1 provides a range of other estimates of the
implicit subsidy α, and these other regression estimates in turn lead to other estimates of the total global
subsidy. While the exact subsidy can vary with the exact regression specification, these large magnitudes
suggest this subsidy may have quantitatively important effects on trade and CO2 emissions.
To put these estimates in perspective, global direct subsidies to fossil fuels were about $530 billion
in 2007 (IMF 2013). These direct subsidies are a focus of political debate. The CO2 subsidies in trade
policy, which have not been previously highlighted, have a similar magnitude. Of course, a direct subsidy
to fossil fuel could have larger effects on CO2 than an indirect subsidy through trade policy.
6.2 Analytical Model
The calculation of the previous subsection does not allow prices or quantities to change. I now turn to
a two-country, two-industry model that provides a simple way to think about the effects of trade policy
on CO2 emissions. This model focuses on key forces while prioritizing simplicity that provides analytical
results. I primarily describe an Armington model, in which countries have a taste for variety, and each
country produces one variety per sector. Online Appendix D describes a more abstract analytical model
with fewer functional form assumptions, no national product differentiation, and a different (perturbation)
approach to studying counterfactuals. As I describe below, that model provides similar conclusions
for unilateral trade policy and some additional insight on the intuition and mechanisms. I show the
Armington model here since it can more readily accommodate counterfactuals where all countries increase
protection on dirty goods and since it is more similar to the quantitative model used in the next subsection.
15In many regression settings, difference-in-difference analyses cannot measure the total effect of a policy, since such regressions
are normalized against a comparison group and have fixed effects that remove any economy-wide effects. My summary calculations
reflect a descriptive regression that is not differences-in-differences—the regression has no comparison group, and is not estimating
a causal effect. Hence, this partial equilibrium calculation assumes that goods with zero tariff have zero subsidy.
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Both the Armington and Appendix models encompasses several potentially important features: pollution
can directly affect utility; pollution creates transboundary damages; baseline policy may be sub-optimal;
and large countries may affect world prices.
Preferences. The representative agent in country j maximizes national utility Uj .
Uj =
∏
s
Q
αjs
js f(Z)
Here Qjs is a consumption aggregate given by Qjs ≡ (
∑
i q
(σ−1)/σ
ijs )
σ/(σ−1). The elasticity of substitution
is σ > 1. Utility depends on international trade (qijs, i 6= j) and intra-national trade (qjjs) in each sector
s ∈ (1, 2). Global pollution emissions Z create exponential damages, with damage function f(Z). The
representative agent treats emissions as a pure externality, so ignores them in choosing expenditure. Sector
1 represents dirty goods that emit pollution; sector 2 represents clean goods that do not. Preferences are
Cobb-Douglas across sectors, with expenditure shares αjs. The associated price index is
Pjs =
[∑
i
(wiτijs)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
Equivalently, one can write the trade elasticity  < 0 as equal to  ≡ 1 − σ. Then  can be interpreted
as the elasticity of trade flows with respect to trade costs. I assume for simplicity (and without loss of
generality) it is constant across sectors. Goods face iceberg trade costs, so τijs ≥ 1 goods must be shipped
for one to arrive. Intra-national trade costs are normalized to one, so τjjs = 1.
Technology. Output is produced one-for-one from a single factor (“labor”), which is inelastically
supplied at price wi. National income is Yi = wiLi.
Pollution. Country j’s pollution emissions Zj come from dirty goods:
Zj =
∑
i
Xij1
Pj1
(5)
Global pollution emissions are Z = Z1 + Z2, and Xijs is total expenditure on goods produced in origin
country i, shipped to destination country j, in sector s.
Equilibrium. Trade is balanced, so each country’s revenues equal its expenditures:
∑
i,sXijs =∑
i,sXjis. Consumer utility maximization implies that international trade flows have the following “grav-
ity” structure:
Xijs =
(
wiτijs
Pjs
)
Ejs
= λijsEjs (6)
where λijs ≡ (wiτijs/Pjs) = Xijs/Xjs denotes the share of country j′s expenditure on sector s varieties
which is sourced from country i , and Xjs =
∑
iXijs is total expenditure on sector s goods in country j.
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Counterfactual Methodology To study counterfactuals, I express each variable as a change from
baseline levels, sometimes called “exact hat algebra” (Dekle et al. 2008; Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
2014). Let a denote some variable from the model in the baseline data, and a′ denote the value of this
variable in a counterfactual world. Define aˆ ≡ a′/a as the proportional change in this variable due to
counterfactual policy. Variables in changes are as follows:
λˆijs =
(
wˆiτˆijs
Pˆjs
)
(7)
Pˆjs =
[∑
i
λijs(wˆiτˆijs)

]1/
(8)
Counterfactual Results. Consider a proportional increase in trade costs for dirty (sector 1) goods,
given by τˆ121, τˆ211 ≥ 1. Substituting the equations for trade flows (6), expenditure shares in changes (7),
and the price index in changes (8) into the pollution equation (5) for counterfactual Z ′ and simplifying
gives the following description of counterfactual global emissions:
Z ′ = [λ111 + (wˆ2τˆ211)λ211]
−1
 Z1 + [(λ121(τˆ121)
 + (wˆ2)
λ221]
−1
 wˆ2Z2 (9)
Here the first bracketed term represents the change in country 1’s emissions (Zˆ1) due to the counterfactual,
and the second bracketed term is the change in country 2’s emissions (Zˆ2) due to the counterfactual.
In equation (9), a unilateral or multilateral increase increase in tariffs for dirty goods produces an
ambiguous change in global emissions. The ambiguity occurs because while increasing trade costs for
dirty goods can decrease global emissions directly, the resulting adjustment of factor prices can decrease
global emissions, since the factor price adjustment can make dirty production more competitive. Whether
the trade cost increase results in a global increase or decrease in emissions depends on baseline values of
trade flows, on the trade elasticity, and on baseline emissions in each sector; this is an empirical question
I address quantitatively in the next subsection.
Two special cases provide clearer results. First, abstract from general equilibrium effects, so wˆ1 =
wˆ2 = 1. This is not a competitive equilibrium. Then equation (9) simplifies to
Z ′ = [λ111 + (τˆ211)λ211]
−1
 Z1 + [(λ121(τˆ121)
 + λ221]
−1
 Z2 (10)
Because a country’s expenditure shares sum to one, because this counterfactual assumes proportional
changes in trade costs weakly exceed one, and because demand slopes down ( < 0), equation (10) shows
that increasing trade costs for dirty goods decreases global emissions (i.e., Z ′ ≤ Z).
Mechanically, this occurs since rising trade costs increase the price index for dirty goods, which
decreases their real output, and therefore decreases pollution emissions. Intuitively, Cobb-Douglas pref-
erences imply that nominal spending on dirty goods is fixed. As the cost of trading these goods rises,
the world becomes less efficient at supplying them. Thus, given constant nominal expenditure on these
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goods, their real value and output decline, and hence pollution emissions decline. The rising trade costs
act like a tax on dirty goods which decreases their real output.
Another useful special case is for two symmetric countries, where factor prices are fixed by symmetry
and the numeraire. This case gives the following:
Zˆ = [λ111 + (τˆ2)
λ211]
−1
 (11)
Again here increasing trade costs for dirty goods decreases global pollution. This effect is larger in settings
where the baseline share of dirty goods that is internationally traded is large (i.e., λ211 is large), and
when demand is especially elastic (i.e., || is large).
A setting with two symmetric countries also allows a simple quantification. Suppose that 20 percent
of dirty goods are traded and a policy increases trade costs for these goods by three percent. These
reflect the idea that around 20 percent of global greenhouse gases cross international borders embodied
in traded goods, and roughly correspond to a $40 per ton of CO2 carbon tariff on global trade. Assume
a trade elasticity of  = −5 (Eaton and Kortum 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop 2004; Simonovska and
Waugh 2014). Applied to equation (11), this gives Zˆi = .967, which implies that increasing trade costs
for dirty goods by three percent decreases global emissions by 3.3 percent.
This simple quantification depends on three terms: the share of dirty goods that is traded (λ211), the
trade elasticity (), and the hypothetical policy (τˆ211). The conclusions are modestly more sensitive to
the baseline trade share than to the other parameters. This is arguably good for robustness since trade
and emissions are directly reported by statistical agencies, whereas the trade elasticity must be estimated
and can take a wide range of values, especially when it varies by sector (e.g., Broda and Weinstein
2006; Caliendo and Parro 2015; Shapiro 2016). For example, doubling the trade elasticity to −10 would
make this hypothetical policy decrease global emissions by 5.6 percent. Doubling the stringency of
the hypothetical policy to τˆ = 1.06 would make this change decrease global emissions by 6.0 percent.
Doubling the baseline expenditure share of dirty goods to λ211 = 0.4 would make this hypothetical policy
decrease emissions by 6.6 percent. Doubling all three of these parameters (so  = −10, λ211 = 0.4 , and
τˆ211 = 1.06) would decrease global emissions by 19.2 percent.
This model assumes both sectors are traded. It is straightforward to verify that adding a third, non-
tradable sector provides the same results, though would lead to different magnitude changes in wages wˆ2
in the counterfactual equation (9). Of course, definitions of certain aggregates for the non-tradable sector
exclude traded goods; for example the aggregate quantity in utility for this sector is simply Qjs ≡ qjjs,
and the price index for this sector is simply Pjs = wi.
Analytical Results from a More General Model
Online Appendix D describes a more abstract model then perturbs it to study the effects of small changes
in trade costs for dirty industries. That model draws on ideas in existing work (Markusen 1975; Copeland
1994; Kortum and Weisbach 2019)
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That more abstract model gives similar patterns as the Armington model above, but some additional
insights. In general, unilateral increases in trade costs for dirty goods still produce ambiguous-signed
effects on global emissions. That model makes the source of ambiguity more explicit—domestic emissions
increase for the country importing the dirty goods, but emissions in the rest of the world may decrease
since the world price of those goods falls. This pattern only occurs for a large importer with market
power for dirty goods.
The Appendix C model shows several forces which make increases in a large country’s import tariffs
decrease global emissions more (or increase them less). First, this occurs when a country has more market
power and increasing tariffs on imports of dirty goods causes a relatively large decrease in world prices.
Second, this occurs when foreign production is especially dirty. This is relevant since many countries
outsource production of dirty goods to trading partners that are coal-intensive, such as China, and since
trade requires emissions for international transportation, which is pollution-intensive. Third, this occurs
in settings with higher baseline tariffs on dirty goods. Finally, this occurs in settings where foreign
production technology is especially concave. This concavity captures the extent to which decreasing the
relative price of dirty goods makes the economy substitute from dirty to clean production.
For a small open economy, the optimal tariff is zero, since tariffs provide no terms-of-trade gain, they
increase domestic emissions, and they do not change foreign emissions. For a large economy, the optimal
tariff equals the inverse elasticity of export supply plus the product of two terms: the tariff’s effect on
global emissions, and the damages from global emissions. Increasing tariffs from below this optimum
increases national welfare, but increasing tariffs beyond that value decreases national welfare.
6.3 Quantitative Model
I now turn to quantify effects of these counterfactuals in a richer model. Some predictions in the previous
subsection had ambiguous signs; other predictions had clear signs but ambiguous magnitudes. The
quantitative model I use here is still highly stylized, but incorporates some additional features—many
countries; many industries; a non-tradable sector; input-output links; trade imbalances; a distinction
between fossil fuel industries and others; a distinction between iceberg trade costs, non-tariff barriers,
and tariffs; and others. Because the model is similar to the “structural gravity” literature in trade
and to the simpler model of the previous subsection, I describe the model’s formal assumptions and
counterfactual methodology in Online Appendix E.
I primarily apply the model using data from Exiobase, though also show results using WIOD. For
computation, I aggregate the data to 10 regions and 21 industries, shown in Appendix Tables 6 and 7. I
assume intra-regional tariffs are zero. Three regions comprise the EU: Western, Southern, and Northern
Europe.
I use sector-specific trade elasticities from aggregating studies that estimate these parameters: Caliendo
and Parro (2015), Shapiro (2016), Bagwell et al. (2018), and Giri et al. (2018). Within a study, I aggre-
gate multiple estimates for a sector using inverse variance weighting, which minimizes variance (Hartung
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et al. 2008).16 I calibrate the damages from CO2 emissions so that a one-ton increase in CO2 emissions
decreases global welfare by $40, which corresponds with prevailing estimates of the social costs of CO2
emissions in 2007 (IWG 2016).
Choice of Counterfactuals
I use this model to analyze six specific counterfactual policies. The first counterfactual changes each
country’s bilateral import tariffs to the country’s weighted mean baseline bilateral tariff, and similarly
for NTBs, with weights equal to baseline trade: t
′
ijs =
∑
s tijsXijs/
∑
sXijs ∀i 6= j. Here tijs denotes the
baseline tariff rate on goods from origin country i to destination country j and sector s, Xijs denotes
the baseline value of bilateral trade, and t
′
ijs denotes the counterfactual tariff. The counterfactual makes
a similar change for NTBs. Policies resembling this counterfactual could result from WTO multilateral
negotiations focused on eliminating tariff escalation or from environmentalists lobbying for tariff harmo-
nization between clean and dirty industries. In regions like the EU which already have a climate change
policy, politicians could argue that this kind of reform decreases leakage. Such policies might even attract
support from dirty industries.
In the second counterfactual, only the EU imposes this policy change: t
′
ijs =
∑
s tijsXijs/
∑
sXijs
∀i 6= j; j ∈ EU ; t′ijs = tijs ∀j /∈ EU . Harmonizing EU trade policy between clean and dirty industries
may be somewhat politically feasible since the EU has a domestic climate change policy, is concerned
about leakage, and supports strong environmental policies.
The third and fourth counterfactuals compare the consequences of changing tariffs and NTBs to the
levels of clean versus dirty industries.Specifically, for each country separately, the third counterfactual
sets all tariffs equal to the mean tariff for the cleanest third of industries, and the mean NTB equal to the
mean NTB for the cleanest third of industries. The fourth counterfactual undertakes the same exercise,
but for the dirtiest third of industries.
In the fifth counterfactual, all countries add a carbon tariff to existing policy: t
′
ijs = Tijs+Eijsd. Here,
Eijs is the emission rate and d is damages chosen to reflect the global externality from CO2 emissions
($40/ton). In the sixth counterfactual, all countries set tariffs and NTBs to zero: t
′
ijs = 0 ∀i, j, s.
Decomposition Methodology
One important question is what channels account for any change in CO2 emissions. I follow the en-
vironmental economics literature in decomposing the change in CO2 emissions due to a counterfactual
into three terms: the change in real output (“scale”), the change in the share of global output from
each industry (“composition”), and the emissions intensity of each industry (“technique”) (Grossman
and Krueger 1993; Copeland and Taylor 2003; Levinson 2009; Shapiro and Walker 2018).
16I take the median estimate across studies since confidence intervals for Giri et al. (2018) are small enough relative to the other
papers that inverse variance weighting across studies implicitly puts disproportionately high weight on that study. Bartelme
et al. (2018) take the median estimates across these studies to estimate trade elasticities.
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One can interpret this decomposition from perturbing global emissions. Write global pollution Z
as the product of total global output X, the share κ of global output that comes from each industry,
and the emissions e per unit output for each industry: Z = Xκ′e. Totally differentiating gives dZ =
dX/X+dκ/κ+de/e. The first term on the right-hand side here is the scale effect, the second term is the
composition effect, and the third is the technique effect. While this model has no technical change, this
is a global decomposition of country×industry data, so the technique effect in part reflects reallocation
of production within an industry across countries with different technologies.
I implement this decomposition as follows. I measure composition as the baseline CO2 intensity of
each industry, weighted by the change in the industry’s share of global output:
Composition Effect =
∑
s
[∑
i Zis∑
iRis
·
∑
i RˆisRis(Pˆis)
−1∑
i,s RˆisRis(Pˆis)
−1
] ∑
i,sRis∑
is Zis
− 1
Here Ris, Zis, and Pis represent a country×industry’s revenue, pollution emissions, and price index,
respectively. The first ratio in this expression is the baseline global emissions intensity of industry s.
The second ratio is the change in the real global output of this industry, divided by the change in global
output of all industries. I multiply these and sum over industries, which provides the change in emissions
intensity that would have occurred with observed changes in composition (second ratio) valued at baseline
emissions intensities (first ratio). The third ratio is the inverse of the global baseline emissions intensity,
so that the composition effect represents a percentage change relative to baseline intensity. I measure the
scale effect as the change in real global output:
Scale Effect =
∑
i,s RˆisRis(Pˆis)
−1∑
i,sRis
− 1
I measure the technique effect as a residual, equal to the counterfactual change in emissions, minus the
scale effect and minus the composition effect:
Technique Effect =
∑
i,s Z
′
is∑
i,s Zis
− 1− Scale Effect − Composition Effect
It is not straightforward to assess the extent to which certain endogenous changes in the model, such
as reallocation of production and transportation, account for the full effect of any counterfactual. I can,
however, provide indirect evidence on the importance of transportation. Most energy used in transporta-
tion comes from petroleum, and most petroleum is used for transportation. Coal is disproportionately
used for the heaviest industries, like electricity generation, cement manufacturing, and steel blast fur-
naces, while natural gas is used for other purposes. Hence, examining the change in emissions from each
fossil fuel provides some insight as to the importance of these channels.
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Counterfactuals: Results for Main Counterfactual of Interest
Appendix Table 8, row 1 analyzes the first counterfactual, in which each country sets the same tariffs and
NTBs on clean and dirty industries. Column (1) shows the percentage change in global CO2 emissions.
Column (2) shows the percentage change in global real income, defined as the weighted sum of country-
specific changes in real income, where the weights are each country’s baseline real income. Column (3)
shows the change in CO2 minus the change in real income (equal to column (1) minus column (2)). This
provides one idea of what might occur if trade policy was scaled so global real income did not change.
Column (4) shows the change in social welfare due to climate damages. Column (5) shows the change
in social welfare due to both the gains from trade and climate damages. Differences in trade elasticities
across industries and trade value across countries mean these counterfactuals can change trade’s volume
and benefits even if they don’t change mean tariffs or NTBs.
I find that this counterfactual of harmonizing trade policy between clean and dirty industries would
decrease global CO2 emissions by about 1.5 percentage points but increase global real income by 1 per-
centage point (Appendix Table 8, row 1). This counterfactual decreases CO2 intensity by 2.5 percentage
points.
Appendix Table 8 shows that the increase in social welfare due to the decreased CO2 emissions is
much smaller than the increase in social welfare due to the increased real income. In general, the gains
from trade are orders of magnitude larger than trade’s climate change externality (Shapiro 2016). In
part, this finding may reflect the fact that prevailing estimates of climate damages assume a quadratic
damage function that is parameterized from the historical experience of modest changes in climate,
and may poorly reflect the costs of large future climate change. Macroeconomic models accounting for
uncertainty, and expert elicitation, suggest that the damages of climate change may be substantially
larger (Cai and Lontzek 2019). A large potential cost is the uncertain possibility that the climate could
increase by more than 5 or even more than 10 degrees Celsius, which could create catastrophic damages
not well measured in prevailing estimates (Weitzman 2009). In part for these reasons, I emphasize the
decrease in CO2 emissions more than the monetization of that decrease.
Appendix Table 8, Row 2, separates these changes by region, though interpreting it requires care.
Because CO2 mixes uniformly in the atmosphere, climate damages are the same regardless of where
CO2 emissions originate. Additionally, this regional allocation identifies where fossil fuels are extracted.
Low protection on dirty industries in baseline data, as the EU has (Figure 4), potentially accelerates
fossil fuel production and consumption in other regions like China and India but decreases it in the EU.
Thus, changing prevailing patterns of trade policy may increase emissions in Europe and decrease them
elsewhere. While one could describe this as a European policy to slow climate change, it may increase
CO2 emissions from Europe but decrease them elsewhere.
Accordingly, the regional allocation in Appendix Table 8, row 2, shows that this counterfactual causes
the largest increases in emissions from Europe. The counterfactual causes the largest decreases in emis-
sions from the Americas and Rest of the World. This counterfactual modestly increases real income in
all regions; that is not predetermined but is driven by differences in trade flows and elasticities across
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regions. Some of the region-specific change are large, though within the range of historical experience.
Row 3 separates these effects into scale, composition, and technique, using the methodology described
above. The scale effect shows that this counterfactual increases real output by 0.8 percentage points.
The composition effect shows that this counterfactual reallocates production across industries so as to
decrease emissions by about 1 percentage point. The technique effect shows that even holding the share of
output across industries fixed, the (weighted) mean industry carbon intensity falls by about 1.4 percentage
points.
Row 4 reports the change by fossil fuel, which helps interpret the composition effect (since only fossil
fuel directly emits CO2 in this analysis). Coal production, which is primarily used for heavy industry,
slightly increases. Oil and gas production each decrease by about 3 percentage points. A majority (though
not all) of oil is used for transportation; this suggests that an important channel here for decreasing
emissions is that dirtier goods are produced domestically and require less shipping. The decrease in gas
suggests that decreased production of goods that rely heavily on gas is another important channel.
The introduction highlighted that using trade policy for environmental goals can produce a range
of responses through changing sourcing countries, transportation, and input choices. This quantitative
analysis suggests that each of these changes accounts for some of the results in this model—Panel A of
Appendix Table 8 shows that this policy increases fossil fuel production from regions that are currently
encouraging trade in dirty goods but decreases it in other regions; this policy decreases in emissions
from oil (one proxy for the change in emissions from transportation), which accounts for about half the
policy’s environmental benefits; and the policy reallocates expenditure across sectors (the composition
effect), which also accounts for an important share of the decrease in emissions.
Appendix Table 9 reports sensitivity analyses. I report results using data from WIOD rather than
Exiobase; using trade elasticities from Caliendo and Parro (2015), changing only tariffs or only NTBs,
removing trade deficits before conducting counterfactuals (as in Dekle et al. (2008)), and using two alter-
native numerical algorithms. Most of these estimates find broadly similar results to the main estimates.
The change in global emissions is about equally from tariffs and NTBs.
Two comparisons suggest these magnitudes are economically important. One is social costs. At a
social cost of carbon of $40 and given emissions in year 2007 of 37 billion tons CO2 and 49 billion tons
of CO2-equivalent from all greenhouse gases (Climate Watch 2019), this counterfactual would decrease
global climate damages by $22 to $29 billion per year.
Another comparison is against other climate change policies. The Waxman-Markey bill, which passed
the House but not the Senate in 2009, would have created a U.S. cap-and-trade market for CO2. The
European Union Emissions Trading System (ETS), a large cap-and-trade market for CO2, is the world’s
largest climate change policy (excluding China’s incipient cap-and-trade market). These policies decrease
global CO2 emissions by roughly 2.6 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively.
17 By comparison, I calculate
17The Waxman-Markey bill would have decreased U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 17 percent in the year 2020 relative to
2005 levels. The U.S. accounted for 15 percent of global CO2 emissions in 2005. Although the Waxman-Markey bill did not pass,
U.S. emissions were similar in 2014 as in 2005 (Climate Watch 2019). Assuming the Waxman-Markey bill would have decreased
U.S. emissions by 17 percent, it would have decreased global emissions by 2.6 percent (=0.15*0.16). In 2005, the EU emitted
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that this trade policy counterfactual would decrease global greenhouse gas emissions by 1.5 percent and
decrease CO2 intensity by 2.5 percent, which is a similar amount or moderately more than the ETS
has. These calculations do compare a global trade policy reform against actual unilateral climate change
policies, though most climate change policy to date has involved individual countries.
6.4 Other counterfactual policies
Appendix Table 8, Panels B through F, presents the results of other counterfactual analyses. Panel B
considers the second counterfactual, in which the EU harmonizes trade policy between clean and dirty
goods. The effects of the EU policy resemble those of the global policy from Panel A, but the magnitudes
are smaller. This counterfactual EU policy would decrease global CO2 emissions by 0.7 percentage points
while increasing global real income by 0.6 percentage points. Although global emissions fall, most of
the increase in emissions is from within the EU, which reflects the idea that the subsidies this paper
highlights are global—low baseline EU tariffs and NTBs on dirty goods increases emissions from outside
the EU, and hence increasing those tariffs and NTBs tends to increase emissions from inside the EU
(though produce larger decreases from outside the EU).
Appendix Table 8, Panels C and D, show the effects of harmonizing trade policy to the levels of
clean versus dirty goods. Both counterfactuals decrease global CO2 emissions, by 2.5 to 3.8 percent.
Real income increases slightly in both counterfactuals, so global CO2 intensity falls by 4 percent. These
counterfactuals suggest that harmonizing trade policy between clean and dirty goods can decrease global
CO2 emissions, regardless of whether the counterfactual trade policy is changed to the level that clean
or dirty goods initially face.
Appendix Table 8, Panel E, considers a counterfactual in which all countries impose a carbon tariff,
i.e., increase existing tariffs by the marginal damage of CO2 emissions embodied in trade policy and leave
NTBs unchanged. This causes a small decrease in global emissions. The effect is small in part because
tariffs account for a minority of the global subsidy (NTBs account for the rest).
Appendix Table 8, Panel F, eliminates import tariffs and NTBs. This policy reform increases real
income by 2.6 percent, which is large enough to cause an increase in global CO2 emissions. Here, the
scale effect dominates any other effects of this policy on CO2 emissions.
Why do some counterfactuals increase real income but decrease global CO2 emissions? This happens
because these reforms address two market failures—trade policy and global CO2 emissions. Eliminating
or harmonizing trade policy across goods can increase real income. Because trade policy encourages
consumption and production of dirty goods, eliminating this price signal also decreases consumption and
production of those dirty goods.
Many recently-discussed trade policy reforms have potential environmental implications. For example,
China has sought to impose export taxes on rare earth minerals and other dirty goods, and the U.S. has
11 percent of global CO2-equivalent (Climate Watch 2019). Some research estimates that the EU ETS decreased EU emissions
relative to a counterfactual by about 10 percent (Dechezlepretre et al. 2018), which implies that the EU ETS decreased global
emissions by about 1.1 percent.
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increased protection on steel and aluminum. This analysis suggests a few conclusions that are relevant
to such reforms: trade policy reforms can have quantitatively meaningful effects on CO2 emissions; it is
valuable to assess both the environmental and traditional costs and benefits of such trade policies; and
policymakers concerned about the environment should consider decreasing protection on clean industries,
not merely increasing protection on dirty industries.
7 Conclusions
This paper asks a simple but new question: how and why do tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) differ
between clean and dirty industries? I define an industry’s “dirtiness” by the total CO2 emitted to produce
a dollar of output. I find a simple answer: tariff and NTB rates are substantially higher on clean than
on dirty goods. This relationship appears in most countries, in cooperative and non-cooperative tariffs,
and in many years and ways of analyzing the data.
At a broad level, this paper suggests that trade policy can have important impacts on environmental
outcomes. The implicit subsidy to CO2 in trade policy this paper analyzes, which has not been previously
identified, totals $550 to $800 billion per year. For comparison, all direct global subsidies to fossil fuel
consumption, which are a major focus of political debates involving the U.S., EU, World Bank, and IMF,
together total about $530 billion per year. General equilibrium model-based analyses require strong
assumptions but suggest that if countries imposed similar tariffs and NTBs on clean and dirty industries,
global CO2 emissions would fall, while global real income would largely not change or slightly increase.
The resulting change in global CO2 emissions has similar magnitude to the estimated effects of some of
the world’s largest actual or proposed climate change policies.
I find that trade policy has this subsidy because political economy variables that determine trade
policy are correlated with CO2 emissions. The data show an important role for an industry’s upstream
location—the extent to which it sells to other firms versus final consumers. I describe theory and evidence
consistent with the idea that firms lobby for high protection on their own outputs but low protection
on their intermediate inputs. Because industries can be well organized but final consumers generally are
not, countries end up with higher tariffs and NTBs on downstream (and clean) goods, and lower tariffs
and NTBs on upstream (and dirty) goods.
These conclusions are relevant to policy. Climate change is a classic externality that would be ad-
dressed efficiently with a Pigouvian tax on CO2 emissions. Today, however, a fifth of global output faces
carbon prices, and existing carbon prices are heterogeneous and below typical estimates of the social cost
of carbon emissions. Countries that do implement carbon prices face concerns that they will decrease
the competitiveness of domestic energy-intensive industries and cause “leakage” of dirty production from
regulated to unregulated regions. A common proposal to address these concerns is a tariff that is pro-
portional to the carbon embodied in imported goods, usually called a carbon tariff or carbon border
adjustment. I show that countries are imposing greater protection on clean than on dirty goods, so in-
stead of internationally adopting a carbon tariff, most countries have implicitly created a carbon subsidy
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in trade policy. Using trade policy negotiations to decrease this environmental bias of trade policy could
help address climate change. This proposal is particularly relevant in regions like the EU which already
have a domestic carbon price, but which currently have trade policies that may be encouraging leakage
of dirty production to other regions rather than preventing it.
What is the political feasibility of harmonizing tariffs and NTBs between clean and dirty industries?
The exact nature of the reform, of course, heavily influences its political feasibility. For example, in-
creasing tariffs and NTBs on upstream goods could disadvantage developing countries, who may have
a comparative advantage in producing upstream goods, though environmental interest groups and dirty
industries might support such reforms. Because dirty industries are disproportionately upstream, down-
stream industries lobbying for low tariffs on their inputs might oppose such reforms. Lobbying from
energy-intensive industries is usually a problem for climate change policy, but for these reforms it would
actually increase their feasibility. More generally, climate change and the environment have never been
part of the argument against tariff escalation, and are rarely part of the debate in choosing relative levels
of tariffs and NTBs across industries. The evidence in this paper suggests that making the environment
part of these policy conversations could produce important benefits.
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Panel C. Actual global tariffs Panel D. Actual U.S. tariffs
Panel E. Actual global non-tariff barriers Panel F. Actual U.S. non-tariff barriers
Figure 1—Trade Protection Versus CO2 Emission Rates
Notes: Panels A and B plot a hypothetical carbon tariff of $40/ton. Each point in global data is an 
importer×industry pair; each point in U.S. data is an industry. CO2 rate is total (direct+indirect) emissions 
measured from inverting an input-output table. Line is linear trend; in Panels C and E, line is fitted from 
regressions including importer fixed effects. Each graph excludes the top 1% of CO2 rates, tariffs, and NTB rate. 
Numbers for line slopes correspond to the specifications and values of Tables 2 and 3, column 5. Standard errors 
are clustered by industry.
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Figure 2—Correlation Between U.S. Import Tariffs and CO2 Emission Rates
Notes: Implicit carbon tax is the coefficient from a regression of import tariffs on CO2 emission rates, 
as in equation (1). Graph shows a separate regression for each year. Emissions intensity is estimated 
from 2007 input-output tables and applied to all years. Circles show the coefficient estimates, bars 
show robust 95% confidence intervals. Regressions use instrumental variables, total CO2 is 
instrumented with direct CO2. 
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Figure 3—Covariance of Trade Protection and CO2 Emission Rates, by Country
Figure 4—Implicit Carbon Tax on Traded Goods, by Country
Notes: Implicit carbon tax is the coefficient from a regression of import tariffs plus NTBs (ad valorem 
equivalent) on CO2 emission rates and a constant, separately for each country. Data correspond to 
Figure 3. Graphs include five rest-of-world groups, one per continent.
Notes: Implicit carbon tax is the coefficient from a regression of import tariffs plus NTBs (ad valorem 
equivalent) on a constant and on total CO2 emission rate (tons/$), measured from inverting the input-
output matrix, which accounts for both primary fossil fuels used in an industry and emissions embodied 
in intermediate goods used in the industry. A separate regression is run for each country. Total CO2 is 
instrumented with the direct CO2 emissions rate from the input-output table, measured in the same 
industry but in the 5 smallest other countries. Data from year 2007. Graph excludes five Exiobase 
countries missing NTB data: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Taiwan. Red circles are point 
estimates, vertical bars are robust 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5—Political Economy Explanations for CO2 Subsidies Implicit in U.S. Imports
Notes:  each blue circle represents the coefficient on total CO2 intensity, instrumented by direct CO2
intensity, from a regression of tariffs+NTBs on CO2 intensity. The red bar depicts the robust 95 percent 
confidence interval. Each regression includes one additional political economy control, indicated at the 
left part of the graph. Regressions are weighted by the value of imports.
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Panel A: All Global Trade
Panel B: U.S. Only
Notes:  solid line is local linear regression of tariffs plus NTBs on upstreamness. Dashed line is local 
linear regression of CO2 intensity on upstreamness. Each observation is an importer×industry (Panel A) 
or an industry (Panels C). All lines use Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth of 0.75.
Figure 6—Upstreamness, CO2 Intensity, and Trade Policy
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CO2 Rate 
(Tons/$)×1000
Import 
Tariff Rate
Non-Tariff 
Barriers
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Cleanest industries
Pork processing 0.34 0.10 0.37
Meat products n.e.c. 0.36 0.10 0.37
Sugar refining 0.37 0.20 0.42
Wood products 0.37 0.01 0.03
Motor vehicles 0.40 0.03 0.05
Mean of cleanest 5 industries 0.37 0.09 0.25
Panel B. Dirtiest industries
Bricks, tiles 1.54 0.02 0.02
Coke oven products 1.64 0.01 0.01
Iron and steel 1.74 0.01 0.02
Phosphorus fertilizer 1.93 0.02 0.11
Nitrogen fertilizer 2.53 0.02 0.11
Mean of dirtiest 5 industries 1.88 0.02 0.05
Table 1—Cleanest and Dirtiest Manufacturing Industries in Global Data
Notes:  CO2 rates are measured in metric tons of CO2 per thousand dollars of output, 
calculated by inverting a global multi-region input output region from Exiobase. 
Dollars are deflated to real 2016 values using U.S. GDP deflator. Global refers to the 
mean value across all countries, weighted by the value of output; industries ordered 
based on global emissions; n.e.c. means not elsewhere classified. Import tariffs are 
ad valorem and measured in year 2007 CEPII Macmap data. Non-tariff barriers are 
ad valorem, from Kee et al. (2009).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. All global trade (global input-output table)
CO2 rate 1.38*** 1.54*** -44.69*** -17.19** -28.28*** -4.48 -32.31*** -11.17**
(0.09) (0.08) (13.24) (8.16) (8.42) (6.17) (8.41) (5.40)
N 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021
Dependent Var. Mean 0.001 0.001 0.052 0.028 0.052 0.028 0.052 0.028
K-P F Statistic — — — — — — 228.96 352.59
Panel B: U.S. Imports (U.S. data)
CO2 rate 1.32*** 1.58*** -7.52*** -10.35*** -4.89*** -3.23*** -5.69*** -6.55***
(0.19) (0.51) (2.00) (3.71) (1.40) (0.94) (1.44) (2.29)
N 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379
Dependent Var. Mean 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.016
K-P F Statistic — — — — — — 50.33 9.77
Weighted X X X X
Table 2—Association of Import Tariffs and CO2 Emissions Rates
Notes:  Table shows regressions of import tariffs on CO2 rates. Weights are the value of imports. Panel A uses 
global Exiobase data; Panel B uses U.S. data. Each observation in Panel A is an importer×industry; each 
observation in Panel B is an industry. Panel A includes importer fixed effects. All regressions include a constant. 
The endogenous variable is the total CO2 emissions rate (tons/$) measured from inverting the input-output 
matrix, which accounts for both primary fossil fuels used in an industry and emissions embodied in intermediate 
goods used in the industry. For Panel A, the instrument is the direct CO2 emissions rate from the input-output 
table,, measured in the same industry but in the 10 smallest other countries. For Panel B, the instrument is the 
CO2 emissions rate measured from MECS and CM, which accounts for primary fossil fuels used in an industry 
and electricity consumed in the industry. Emissions rates measured in metric tons of CO2 per dollar of output. 
Output is measured in 2016 US$, deflated with the U.S. GDP deflator. FS is first-stage, RF is reduced-form, OLS 
is ordinary least squares, IV is instrumental variables. All data from year 2007. Standard errors clustered by 
industry are in parentheses. Asterisks denote p-value * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** <0.01.
FS RF OLS IV
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. All global trade (global input-output table)
CO2 rate 1.38*** 1.54*** -124.15*** -116.51** -85.58*** -73.22* -89.78*** -75.67**
(0.09) (0.08) (40.92) (43.81) (24.33) (36.75) (26.75) (29.38)
N 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021
Dep. Var. Mean 0.001 0.001 0.126 0.088 0.126 0.088 0.126 0.088
K-P F Statistic — — — — — — 228.96 352.59
Panel B. U.S. imports (U.S. data)
CO2 rate 1.32*** 1.58*** -63.34*** -59.13*** -41.04*** -17.98*** -47.96*** -37.41***
(0.19) (0.51) (16.68) (20.78) (7.44) (4.15) (10.03) (12.33)
N 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379
Dep. Var. Mean 0.001 0.001 0.109 0.079 0.109 0.079 0.109 0.079
K-P F Statistic — — — — — — 50.33 9.77
Weighted X X X X
Table 3—Association of Non-Tariff Barriers and CO2 Emissions Rates
Notes:  Table shows regression of NTB rates on CO2 rates. Columns 1 through 4 are weighted by the value of 
imports. Panel A uses global Exiobase data; Panel B uses U.S. data. Each observation in Panel A is an 
importer×industry; each observation in Panel B is an industry. Panels A includes importer fixed effects. All 
regressions include a constant. The endogenous variable is the total CO2 emissions rate (tons/$) measured from 
inverting the input-output matrix, which accounts for both primary fossil fuels used in an industry and emissions 
embodied in intermediate goods used in the industry. For Panel A, the instrument is the direct CO2 emissions 
rate from the input-output table, measured in the same industry but in the 10 smallest other countries. For Panel 
B, the instrument is the CO2 emissions rate measured from MECS and CM, which accounts for primary fossil 
fuels used in an industry and electricity consumed in the industry. Emissions rates measured in metric tons of 
CO2 per dollar of output. Output is measured in 2016 US$, deflated with the U.S. GDP deflator. FS is first-
stage, RF is reduced-form, OLS is ordinary least squares, IV is instrumental variables. All data from year 2007. 
The dependent variable is the ad valorem NTB rate from Kee et al. (2009). Standard errors clustered by industry 
are in parentheses. Asterisks denote p-value * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** <0.01.
FS RF OLS IV
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. All global trade
CO2 rate -120.55*** -32.90 -120.76***-121.42***-120.92***-120.44***
(33.73) (25.60) (33.17) (35.50) (34.12) (33.62)
N 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990
Panel B. All global trade, instrument for political economy
CO2 rate -120.55*** 34.61 -111.66***-125.64*** -101.50** -119.33***
(33.73) (38.88) (40.04) (47.61) (43.86) (33.95)
K-P F Statistic — 43.29 27.20 41.97 10.15 21.05
N 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990
Panel C. U.S. imports
CO2 rate -49.72*** 2.74 -51.99*** -47.50*** -49.75*** -54.32***
(9.90) (10.19) (10.54) (10.32) (12.19) (10.45)
N 358 358 358 358 358 358
Upstreamness X
Intra-industry X
Import pen. ratio X
Labor share X
Mean wage X
Table 4—Political Economy Explanations for Implicit Carbon Taxes
Notes:  Dependent variable in all regressions is sum of tariffs and NTBs. Each observation is 
a country*industry (Panels A and B) or industry (Panel C). In all regressions, CO2 rate is the 
total CO2 rate (tons/$) from inverting an input-output table, which is instrumented with the 
direct CO2 rate. In panel B, each political economy variable (upstreamness, intra-industry 
share, etc.) is instrumented with the mean of each political economy variable in the industry 
of interest across the five smallest other countries in the data, measured by gross 
manufacturing output. Panels A and B use Exiobase data, panel C uses U.S. data. Panels A 
and B include country fixed effects. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors 
clustered by industry are in parentheses. Asterisks denote p-value * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** 
<0.01.
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A2
A Data Details
A.1 Concordances
The paper uses several concordances across definitions and years of industry and product
codes. As a general guide, raw data on traded goods, tariffs, and NTBs are at the level of
a 6-digit harmonized system (HS) code. Raw U.S. data are at the level of a 6-digit North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. Exiobase uses industry codes based
on the International Standard Industrial Classification, version 3.1. WIOD also uses its own
industry codes. I use published concordances between these various industry codes. I use
weighted concordance files when possible, i.e., which express the share of an industry’s output
in one classification which corresponds to each possible industry in a different classification.
Ultimately, I concord raw data to the industry definition of the relevant analysis (Exiobase,
U.S., or WIOD).
Concording Exiobase files are fairly straightforward. Exiobase industries were constructed
to closely reflect ISIC industries, so I construct a concordance by matching names between
these two industry classifications.
Linking U.S. industry codes is more complicated. A few concordances link 2007 NAICS
codes to other industry codes. Some of the U.S. political economy explanations are from
the May 2007 Current Population Survey, which defines industries using 2007 U.S. census
codes (i.e., the codes defined for use in the 2007 U.S. Economic Census, which is distinct
from the decennial population census; these codes differ from NAICS codes). I use Census
Bureau files to link these census industries to 2007 NAICS industries.1 The unionization
coverage data I use as one political economy explanation use industry codes from the 2000
U.S. census, so I use the same concordance file to link these to 2007 NAICS codes. One
sensitivity analysis aggregates the U.S. data to 21 ISIC industries; I link NAICS to ISIC
codes using a Census concordance.2
Another set of concordances links U.S. industry codes for other years. The 2006 MECS
data are at the level of 2002 NAICS codes, so I also link these to ISIC codes using U.S.
Census Bureau files.3 U.S. input-output tables use an input-output industry classification
which is similar but not identical to NAICS. I use a file that is part of the 2007 input-output
table which contains a concordance between 2007 input-output codes and 2012 NAICS codes.
I concord 2012 NAICS codes to 2007 NAICS codes using a concordance file from the U.S.
Census Bureau which includes industry shares (file EC1200CBDG1). The PAC contributions
data are at the level of 1987 Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC); I link these to NAICS
codes using a concordance from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database (Becker
et al. 2013). A few datasets report NAICS codes for some observations at 2, 3, 4, or 5 digits;
for these more aggregated values, I construct concordances at this more aggregated level and
then translate industry codes appropriately.
1Downloaded from https://www.census.gov/people/io/files/IndustryCrosswalk90-00-02-07-12.xls, visited
8/18/2017.
2Downloaded from https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html, visited
8/8/2017.
3Downloaded from https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html, visited
8/8/2017.
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A.2 Global Input-Output Data
I use Exiobase (specifically, version 2.2.2, industry-by-industry, fixed product sales assump-
tion) because it distinguishes 48 countries and 163 industries, about 50 of which are in
manufacturing. Five of the “countries” are actually aggregates that include all countries in
a given region that are not separately identified in the data, such as the aggregate, “Rest
of Asia.” Exiobase is supported by the European Union. Other global multi-region input-
output tables, like the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), typically distinguish only
20-60 industries, only 15-20 of which are tradable manufacturing industries.
Much of the global value chain literature uses the World Input Output Database (WIOD)
and related multi-region input-output tables. I focus on Exiobase, which I believe has not
been used in this literature, since it has far richer industry detail than WIOD and related
datasets. Exiobase is widely used in industrial ecology research (e.g., Tukker et al. 2013;
Moran and Wood 2014; Wood et al. 2015). I report some sensitivity analyses using WIOD
(Timmer et al. 2015).
Exiobase is built from several primary data sources (Wood et al. 2015). Exiobase com-
bines supply and use output tables for the EU27 via Eurostat, and for 16 other countries that
together cover over 90 percent of global GDP. It measures trade using BACI, which is based
on the UN’s Comtrade database, and using the UN’s services trade databases. To harmonize
data across countries, Exiobase also uses data from FAO and the European AgroSAM, the
IEA, and other data sources. National fossil fuel use comes from IEA sources, while some
industry detail comes from Pulles et al. (2007).
Like all global multi-region input-output tables, Exiobase applies statistical algorithms
to harmonize these different datasets. National input-output tables also do this; Horowitz
and Planting (2006) describe the process. The final data must satisfy many accounting
identities; for example, imports must equal exports, subject to trade imbalances; industry-
specific values must add up to national values; the value of intermediate goods plus value
added must equal gross output; etc. Harmonization also expresses all countries in the same
industries and using the same price concepts.
How does Exiobase compare to other multi-region input-output tables? Several stud-
ies compare Exiobase to WIOD and Eora. These studies find that the numbers in these
databases are not especially sensitive to the different algorithms used to construct these
tables (Geschke et al. 2014), that consumption-based CO2 accounts (sometimes called a
country’s “carbon footprint”) or raw materials that each country consumes generally differ
by less than 10-15 percent across these databases (Moran and Wood 2014; Giljum et al. 2019),
and that disaggregation to more industry detail, which is Exiobase’s focus, tends to produce
more accurate analysis of CO2 (Steen-Olsen et al. 2014; de Koning et al. 2015). The Global
Trade and Analysis Project (GTAP), which constructs another multi-region input-output
table, is widely used in computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses in part since it in-
corporates a ready-made CGE model, simplified coding language, online support services,
and hundreds of parameters. GTAP, however, also includes only around 20 manufacturing
industries, and its data construction are less well documented than some other input-output
tables. WIOD is generally seen as having higher data quality, which may be because it
has fewer countries (43 in WIOD versus 190 in Eora), which lets WIOD rely on data from
higher-quality statistics agencies and require less imputation for the additional countries.
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Exiobase covers 43 countries plus five rest-of-world aggregates, which is similar to WIOD.
The possibility of measurement error in these data is one reason why I report results from
three separate input-output tables – Exiobase, WIOD, and U.S. national data – and also ob-
tain completely independent measures of CO2 emissions for use as an instrumental variable
in the U.S. data.
Comparing the U.S. and Exiobase data is complicated by the fact that U.S. NAICS
industry codes and Exiobase industry codes do not easily concord to each other and require
applying multiple many-to-many concordances. To provide such a comparison while limiting
additional measurement error, I select the 30 Exiobase manufacturing industries that have
a one-to-one or one-to-many mapping to 4- or 6-digit NAICS codes (thus excluding those
with many-to-many links). For these 30 Exiobase industries, I then calculate the mean total
emissions rate from the U.S. data (weighting across 6-digit U.S. NAICS industries within
an Exiobase industry by the value of shipments). In logs, a regression of the U.S. CO2
rate calculated from Exiobase data on this rate calculated from U.S. data gets a regression
coefficient of 1.035 (robust standard error 0.020), with an R-squared of 0.989. In levels,
this regression coefficient is 0.801 (0.210), with an R-squared of 0.56. These are strong
correlations, though for a focused sample; since Exiobase is constructed from national input-
output tables it is perhaps unsurprising that its patterns for the U.S. are similar to those of
the national U.S. input-output table.
I calculate gross output in Exiobase 2.2 (which does not directly report it) as follows.
Gross output Y equals the sum of intermediate inputs I and factor payments L, where
factor payments are defined to include payments to labor, payments to capital including
profits (i.e., including markups), and taxes:
Y = I + L (1)
To measure intermediate inputs I in millions of Euros for each country×industry, I take
the sum across rows (within each column) of the Exiobase Use table. To measure factor
payments per gross output L/Y , I use the Exiobase Factor Inputs table and exclude entries
recording employment in hours per million Euros or in workers per million Euros. I then
calculate L/Y as the sum across rows (within each column) of this table. Finally, simple
manipulation of (1) shows that gross output for each country×industry is
Y =
I
1− L
Y
where I and L/Y are calculated from the Use table and Factor Inputs table as described
above.
Given this measure of gross output, I follow Antra`s et al. (2012) and Antra`s and Chor
(2018) in calculating upstreamness. In the raw Exiobase input-output table, each row is an
origin country×sector and each column is a destination country×sector. Each entry in this
table is in terms of Euros of inputs per Euro of output (i.e., the table is in coefficient form).
I convert this to Euros by multiplying each entry by the gross output of the destination
country×sector. I calculate total international exports Xij from domestic industry i to
foreign buyers of industry j as the sum of this table across columns (within a row), excluding
columns with the same origin and destination country. I calculate total international imports
A5
Mij from foreign industry i to domestic industry j as the sum of this table across rows (within
a column) which have the same origin and destination country.
The main results use CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, which is the best-
measured and accounts for most greenhouse gas emissions. I also report results using other
greenhouse gas emissions. I incorporate two corrections for outliers in the raw data. First,
for each greenhouse gas separately, I replace emissions from nitrogen fertilizer production
with emissions from phosphorus fertilizer emissions from the same country. Second, for the
crude oil extraction industry, I replace non-combustion methane emissions with combustion
methane emissions. In both cases, raw data from Exiobase are outliers and exceed estimates
from other sources. For similar reasons, in regressions including non-manufacturing goods, I
exclude one mining industry with outlier values of emissions rates, “Extraction, liquefaction,
and regasification of other petroleum and gaseous materials,” which is distinct from crude
oil or natural gas extraction.
The quantitative model requires data on CO2 emissions from production of each fossil
fuel in each country. I obtain these data from reports using the International Energy Agency
containing data from the year 2007 (IEA 2009b,a), which list the physical units of each fossil
fuel produced in each country. I convert these into CO2 using standard conversion rates
of physical units of fossil fuel (i.e., tons or terajoules) to metric tons of CO2 from the U.S.
Energy Information Agency.
In the sensitivity analysis using WIOD, I measure environmental outcomes using data on
total CO2 emissions. I replace the roughly 5 percent of WIOD country×industry observations
which have missing CO2 values to instead have the mean global CO2 emissions rate for that
industry, multiplied by the country×industry’s reported gross output. If a country×industry
reports zero output, I set CO2 emissions for that country×industry also to equal zero. To aid
computation, I replace the roughly 2 percent of country×industry observations that report
zero output to have output 10−7. Because WIOD does not separately distinguish types of
mining, in the WIOD estimates all mining activities are combined into one sector, and both
electricity generation and transportation are combined into the “other industries” sector.
A few WIOD international flows are negative, primarily representing gross fixed capital
formation and changes in inventories and valuables. In WIOD estimates that aggregate
over industry categories or countries and use trade values as weights in this aggregation, I
assume these negative flows instead have values of zero. As with Exiobase, I exclude the five
countries missing NTB data (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Slovak Republic, and Taiwan).
A.3 Political Economy Variables
I group the political economy variables into those reflecting the demand for versus supply
of protection. The global data come from Exiobiase, but the U.S.-specific data with greater
industry detail come from a range of sources. Optimal tariffs are perhaps the simplest. I
use estimates of the export supply elasticity for the U.S. at the 10 digit harmonized system
code level from Soderbery (2015); the results are qualitatively similar using estimates from
Broda and Weinstein (2006).
A few variables reflect demand for low protection from customers. Industries may lobby
for low protection on goods they use as inputs. Industries with a large share of intra-industry
trade, i.e., where both exports and imports are common, may have less trade protection since
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importers lobby for protection while exporters (who are concerned with retaliation) lobby
against protection. I measure intra-industry trade using the common measure 1 − |xi−mi|
xi+mi
,
where xi and mi represent total exports and imports in industry i (Krugman 1981). These
data come from the Census Bureau’s Imports and Exports of Merchandise data series.
Another set of political economy variables reflects an industry’s demand for protection on
its own goods. Declining or “sunset” industries may obtain more government support since
sunk costs prevent entry and incentivize incumbents to lobby to protect remaining rents.
I calculate the change in the value of shipments for each industry between the years 1977
and 2007, adjusted by industry-specific output deflators, using data from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry Database. Industries more exposed to foreign trade have more to
gain from protection. I measure the import penetration ratio as log of the total imports
divided by the value of shipments, in levels for the year 2007 and as a trend over the
period 2002-2007, using data from the NBER-CES database for gross output and Imports of
Merchandise for imports. Industries with more workers have more stakeholders potentially
benefiting from protection; I calculate each industry’s labor share as total workers divided by
the value of shipments, using data from the NBER-CES database. Industries with a large
share of low skill or low wage workers may obtain protection as a tool for redistribution,
either out of general concern for equity or as an alternative to other transfers. I measure
mean wages and the share of workers with some college education, using data from the May
2007 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC).4
One additional variable measures the “local” air pollution for each industry. I combine
the six major air pollutants that the Clean Air Act targets and that are typically mea-
sured: carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter smaller than 2.5
micrometers (PM2.5), particulate matter smaller than 10 micrometers (PM10), sulfur dioxide
(SO2), and volatile organic compounds (VOC). I measure emissions of each pollutant from
the year 2008 data of the National Emissions Inventory (NEI), a national dataset created by
the Environmental Protection Agency that measures the tons of pollution emitted from each
plant or other source. The costs of these emissions vary over space and across pollutants.
To provide a scalar measure of these costs, I use a measure of the marginal damage for each
pollutant in each U.S. county, from Muller and Mendelsohn (2012). These damages reflect
leading estimates of how air pollution affects health, agriculture, amenities, etc. For each
industry, I calculate the damage rate as emissions per industry×pollutant×county times
damages per pollutant×county, summed across counties and pollutants, and divided by the
industry’s revenues.
A separate set of variables reflects the cost of organizing an industry to lobby for pro-
tection, i.e., the supply of protection. A challenge in lobbying is overcoming the free-riding
problem within each industry to pay for the costs of lobbying (Olson 1965). Concentrated
industries or industries with a few larger firms can better overcome the challenge. I measure
4A worker’s industry is defined from her current job for employed workers, or the most recent job for
workers who are unemployed or not in the labor force. I measure the share of workers with at least some
college education. For wages, I measure the hourly wage for the Outgoing Rotation Group if it is reported.
Otherwise I calculate hourly wages as total wage and salary income for the previous calendar year, divided
by the product of weeks worked last year and usual hours worked per week last year. I calculate wages
using the individual (earnings) survey weights, and calculate education using the standard individual survey
weights.
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industry concentration as the share of an industry’s output accounted for by the four largest
firms, using data from the Economic Census (specifically, the Census of Manufacturers).
I calculate mean firm size as the total value of shipments for the industry divided by the
total number of establishments in the industry, also using data from the Economic Census.
Using the same data, I calculate the standard deviation of firm size (Bombardini 2008).
Since capital intensity tends to increase concentration, and is also a primary determinant
of comparative advantage and U.S. imports, I also measure the capital share as the value
of the capital stock divided by gross output, using the NBER-CES database. High trans-
port costs and geographic dispersion make an industry less geographically or economically
concentrated, so more difficult to organize. I measure shipping costs per dollar×kilometer,
using data from the U.S. Imports of Merchandise series and CEPII’s measure of geographic
distance between countries. I measure geographic dispersion as entropy across states, using
data from County Business Patterns.5 Disadvantaged industries, including those with a high
share of workers who are unemployed, may have greater incentive to lobby since their oppor-
tunity cost of doing so is lower. I measure unemployment rates of workers where industry is
defined according to the current or most recent industry worked, using data from the May
2007 CPS. Unions provide an organized association to lobby for protection, so I measure
unionization rates using processed values from the May 2007 CPS (Hirsch and MacPherson
2003). I also use one direct though incomplete measure of lobbying on contributions to
Political Action Committees (PACs), using data from the Center for Responsive Politics.
Upstreamness turns out to be the most relevant of these variables. Formally, for a closed
economy with S industries, upstreamness is U = [I−dijYj/Yi]−11. Here, U is an S×1 column
vector where each entry is the upstreamness value for one industry, I is the S × S identity
matrix, dij is the input-output coefficient (i.e., the dollars of sector i goods needed to produce
a dollar of industry j goods), Yi is the output of industry i, and 1 is a vector of ones. The
term dijYj/Yi represents an S × S matrix where each entry equals the share of output from
industry i that industry j purchases. Antra`s et al. (2012) show that this measure, originally
from Fally (2012), is analytically equivalent to the upstreamness measure described in Antra`s
and Chor (2013). Versions of these definitions for global multi-region input-output tables
are similar, though each observation is an industry×country rather than just an industry
(Antra`s and Chor 2018).
For the U.S. data, I measure upstreamness using the 2007 U.S. input-output table after
redefinitions. Appendix Figure 1, Panel D, plots upstreamness separately for all global
production and for U.S. production. In all these graphs, the most upstream industries
are on the left and the most downstream industries are on the right. The full measure of
upstreamness in Panel D ranges from 5 (most upstream) to 1 (most downstream)
5Formally, the analysis defines geographic dispersion as
∑
j yij lnyij , where yij ≡ Yij/Yi, and where Yij is
output of state j and Yi is total output. In County Business Patterns, each observation lists total employment
in a given state×industry. Some values are suppressed due to confidentiality, but identified as falling in one
of twelve employment size bins (1 to 19; 20 to 99; etc.). I impute these values as the midpoint of each bin,
and impute the top bin (>100,000) as 125,000.
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A.4 Trade Policy
Most of the trade policy data are straightforward. The NTB values exclude five countries
that are in Exiobase but that I hence exclude from much of the analysis: Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Malta, Slovakia, and Taiwan. In cases where tariff data are missing for Luxembourg, I
replace them with tariffs for Belgium. The country-by-country map in Figure 5 shows values
for many individual countries that are part of regional aggregates like “Rest of Europe” or
“Rest of Asia”
The NTB data have some limitations. Unlike tariffs, they are the result of calculations
and are not raw data. At the same time, they are widely used in research on trade policy
(Irwin 2010; Lima˜o and Tovar 2011; Novy 2013; Handley 2014); Bagwell and Staiger (2011,
p. 1250) describe them as “the best [NTB] measures that are available.” These data differ
by importer and 6-digit HS code, though not by importer-exporter pair.
The time coverage of the NTB data precedes recent policy changes. Between 2009 and
2016, temporary trade barriers including antidumping policies, countervailing duties, and
safeguards increased on high income economies’ intermediate goods imports from China.
These patterns have been less pronounced for final goods trade with China, trade with
other countries, or emerging economies (Bown 2018). The U.S. has also increased tariffs in
its 2018-2019 trade war on a wide range of goods—initially on intermediate goods, though
eventually covering much trade with China. I report some results analyzing these recent
changes in tariffs.
One sensitivity analysis compares cooperative and non-cooperative tariffs for the U.S.,
China, and Japan. The U.S. applies non-cooperative tariffs to Cuba and North Korea. China
applies non-cooperative tariffs to Andorra, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Bhutan, the British
Virgin Islands, the British Cayman Islands, French Guiana, Palestinian Territory (West Bank
and Gaza), Gibraltar, Monserrat, Nauru, Aruba, New Caledonia, Norfolk Island, Palau,
Timor-Leste, San Marino, the Seychelles, Western Sahara, and Turks and Caicos Islands.
Japanese non-cooperative tariffs apply to Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Lebanon,
North Korea, and Timor-Leste (Ossa 2014).
Appendix Figure 1, Panel A, plots the density of tariffs, excluding the top 1% for visual
clarity. The mean global tariff is three to five percent, while the 99th percentile globally
is sixty percent. U.S. import tariffs are lower, with mean and median around two percent
and the 99th percentile at nearly fifteen percent. Appendix Figure 1, Panel B, plots the
density of NTBs. For all global trade, tariffs and NTBs have somewhat similar values; for
U.S. imports, average NTBs exceed average tariffs.
A.5 Emissions
Most emissions data are described in the main text. All tons in this paper refer to metric tons.
All discussion of CO2 refers to CO2 from fossil fuel combustion, which is best measured and
accounts for a large majority of CO2 emissions, except one sensitivity analysis that includes
CO2 from process emissions and other greenhouse gases.
CO2 accounts for roughly 76 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, methane (CH4)
accounts for 16 percent, nitrous oxide (N2O) for 6 percent, and fluorinated gases like hy-
drofluorocarbons (HFCs) for 2 percent (IPCC 2014). CO2 accounts for 82 percent of U.S.
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greenhouse gas emissions (USEPA 2019). Methane is emitted from extraction, transporta-
tion, and processing of coal, oil, and natural gas, in addition to coming from agriculture
and landfills. Researchers have a general consensus on the magnitude of CO2 emissions, but
are still debating and improving measurement of methane emissions, particularly from fossil
fuels (e.g., Alvarez et al. 2018).
For analyses of the U.S. only, the paper uses four other CO2 datasets. One is the U.S. de-
tailed benchmark input-output table after redefinitions for 2007, produced by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. For this purpose, I use the industry-by-industry total requirements table.
The second data source is the U.S. Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS),
which reports physical quantities of fossil fuels combusted for a large sample of manufactur-
ing plants in the year 2006. (MECS is only conducted every few years.) The third dataset
is the Census of Manufactures (CM), which reports expenditure on electricity and on total
fossil fuels for each 6-digit NAICS industry in the year 2007. Because MECS is a sample of
only 10,000 plants, I use MECS to measure each industry’s tons of CO2 emissions per dollar
of fossil fuel expenditure, and multiply this by the CM data on each industry’s total fossil
fuel expenditure. The fourth is U.S. emissions coefficients reporting mean national tons of
CO2 emitted per dollar of coal, oil, and natural gas input, obtained from the U.S. Energy
Information Agency and Environmental Protection Agency.
For the analysis of the U.S. input-output table, I measure price per BTU produced of
each fossil fuel (coal, crude oil, and natural gas) from the Energy Information Agency’s
year 2016 Annual Energy Review, and I measure metric tons of CO2 per BTU using EPA
emissions factors.6 Analysis of the U.S. data excludes observations with missing emissions
or trade policy data.
I use the publicly available version of MECS. In measuring energy consumption as fuel in
trillion BTU, I assume that suppressed values less than 0.5 (denoted with an asterisk) equal
zero. For withheld cells (denoted by Q or W), I impute the value as manufacturing’s overall
share of BTU from a fuel, multiplied by the industry’s total BTUs.
The paper’s main approach to measuring total emissions involves inverting an input-
output table. The diagonal of an input-output table, which generally has the largest values
in an input-output table, describes outputs from an industry that are used to produce output
in the same industry. This implies that fossil fuels which are used to produce fossil fuels
(e.g., oil used to power a drill that is used to extract oil) are captured in this approach since
they appear on the diagonal of the input-output table.
Appendix Figure 1, Panel C, plots the density of these total CO2 emission rates, sepa-
rately for all global trade and for all U.S. imports. For U.S. and global trade, the median
CO2 emission rate is 0.5 to 1.0 tons CO2 per thousand dollars of output. Emissions rates for
the U.S. have a longer right tail since the U.S. data have more industry detail.
B Implicit Carbon Tariffs: Sensitivity Analyses
Appendix Table 1 reports numerous other estimates of the implicit CO2 subsidies. Row 1
repeats the main estimates from Tables 2 and 3. Row 2 reports marginal effects from a tobit,
6Data from https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-03/documents/emission-
factors mar 2018 0.pdf, visited 11/19/2019.
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since some industries have zero tariffs or NTBs. Row 3 reports an instrumental variables
tobit where direct CO2 intensity is the instrument for total CO2 intensity. Row 4 clusters
standard errors by the importing country.
Rows 5-7 report estimates that allow for nonlinear effects of CO2. Row 5 estimates the
dependent and independent variable in logs, and so estimates an elasticity. This specification
excludes observations with zero tariff or NTB. Row 6 specifies the CO2 rate as a quadratic
polynomial, and reports estimates of the slope ∂t/∂E at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile
of the distribution of CO2 values. Row 7 estimates a nonparametric regression (a third-order
B-spline) and reports the average marginal effect.
Rows 8-15 report other ways of cleaning and aggregating data. Row 8 replaces the
bottom and top percent of the dependent and independent variables as equal to the 1st and
99th percentile values. Row 9 includes non-manufactured goods (agriculture and mining),
alongside the manufactured goods analyzed in most of the paper. Row 10 uses a dataset
defined at the level of a bilateral trading pair and industry (i×j×s rather than j×s). Row
11 uses the same approach but adds exporter fixed effects.7 Row 12 aggregates to one
industry per observation. Row 13 includes intra-national trade (i = j) in the measurement
of emissions rates, with an intra-national tariff and NTB rate of zero.
Rows 14-16 use other measures of emissions. Row 14 considers only direct emissions,
measured from the input-output table. Row 15 includes both the direct and total emissions,
both measured from the input-output table. Row 16 uses data on all greenhouse gases and
sources in Exiobase, including nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), and emissions of each
greenhouse gas from non-combustion processes.
Rows 17-19 consider other ways of measuring the emissions rate of energy-consuming
durable goods. The baseline regressions ignore emissions from goods that are complements
or substitutes with the focal good. For example, changing tariffs on cereal might change
consumption of milk, but the energy intensity of cereal in this analysis does not account
for the energy intensity of milk. While estimating a flexible demand system of many cross-
elasticities across goods in the global economy is beyond the scope of this paper, measuring
emissions from consumption is potentially most important for durable goods that require
energy to operate, including transportation goods like cars and appliances like air condi-
tioners.8 For these goods especially, abstracting from the energy that is complementary to
consuming these goods provides an incomplete picture of the emissions due to trading these
goods. This is relevant because energy-consuming durables are relatively downstream and
are relatively clean according to the approach of this paper.
Rows 17-19 take two approaches for energy-consuming durables. Row 17 excludes energy-
consuming durable household goods from the analysis, including machinery and equipment
7One alternative candidate explanation for tariff escalation is that countries offer preferential market
access to developing countries, which specialize in upstream goods. Under this explanation, controlling for
exporter fixed effects would attenuate both tariff escalation and implicit tariffs. The estimates of row 11,
which include these fixed effects, are actually larger in absolute value than the estimates of row 10, which
do not use these fixed effects, which could suggest that this candidate explanation is not the predominant
driver of tariff escalation or of the environmental bias of trade policy.
8The question of how to account for emissions from consumption versus production of international
services trade, such as international airplane flights, is also important. Because tariffs do not apply to trade
in services, and because the Kee et al. (2009) data I use on NTBs cover goods and not services, I leave the
analysis of NTBs involving services and the environment to future research.
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not elsewhere classified (a category including appliances), motor vehicles, trailers, semi-
trailers, and other transport equipment. Row 18 assumes that the emissions rate for these
durable goods is an unweighted average of the emission rate for these durable goods and the
emission rate for energy in the importing country. Row 19 assumes that the emission rates
for these goods is a weighted average of the emission rate for these goods and for energy in
the importing country, with weights of 5 percent and 95 percent, respectively. The emission
rate for energy averages over petroleum refining, natural gas extraction, and all forms of
electricity production, where weights equal the gross output of each industry in the importing
country. These different weighting schemes reflect evidence on the importance of emissions
from manufacturing versus operation for these goods (Union of Concerned Scientists 2013;
Nahlik et al. 2015; Amienyo et al. 2016).
Rows 20 through 25 show other sensitivity analyses. Row 20 shows the reverse regression
of emissions rates E on trade policy t. Row 21 replaces the usual tariff measure on goods,
dt, with a life cycle measure (I − A)−1dt. This accounts for tariffs on inputs, and inputs to
inputs, etc. Row 22 estimates the regression without importer fixed effects. Row 23 uses
data from the World Input Output Dataset (WIOD). Row 24 adds industry fixed effects.
Row 25 excludes manufactured agricultural goods and manufactured food products.
Most results in Appendix Table 1 are similar to the main estimates, though some vary in
their magnitudes. I highlight some of the more important differences here. Tobit estimates
obtain larger estimates of implicit subsidies for NTBs but not tariffs, since more observa-
tions have zero NTBs. The estimates that allow for nonlinearity in CO2 rates generally find
negative slope, though the magnitude differs across the support of CO2 rates—the quadratic
estimates in row 6, for example, imply a wide range of estimated global subsidies, while
nonparametric estimates in row 7 imply a global subsidy of about $100/ton. Incorporating
intra-national trade (row 13) modestly increases the weighted but decreases the unweighted
estimates in absolute value. Direct emissions have a similar association with trade policy
as total emissions do; when a regression includes both, the coefficient on total emissions
accounts for more of the total subsidy, though neither estimate is precise, perhaps in part
due to multicollinearity. Excluding energy-consuming durable goods from the analysis or
adjusting emission rates of these goods to account for energy used in their consumption does
not substantially change the estimated subsidy in absolute value. The reverse regression has
smaller coefficients since it reverses the dependent and independent variables. The WIOD
data still imply subsidies but are imprecise, partly because they only have 15 tradable man-
ufacturing industries. Adding industry fixed effects nearly eliminates the implicit subsidy.
This is perhaps unsurprising since industry-level estimates in row 12 are similar to baseline
estimates in row 1, though this does suggest that whatever economic forces create these sub-
sidies operate at the industry level and are similar within an industry and across countries.
Excluding agricultural and food manufactured products produces smaller estimates of the
implicit subsidies.
Appendix Table 1, rows 26-27, focus on the recent trade war by analyzing U.S. import
tariffs at the end of 2018. Row 26 estimates the implicit subsidy for U.S. import tariffs using
tariff data from 2017, as in Figure 2. Row 27 augments these data with the sum of five rounds
of tariffs imposed in 2018, which targeted washers, solar panels, aluminum, and Chinese
imports. I measure these tariffs using data from Fajgelbaum et al. (2020). Unweighted
estimates show a modest decrease in trade policy’s environmental bias, of nearly a dollar a
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ton, while weighted estimates show a smaller increase. These estimates are mixed because
while much attention focused on dirty goods like aluminum or steel, the most CO2-intensive
goods like refined petroleum and cement did not experience tariff changes in this time period.
Some goods with larger increases in tariffs in this period, like semiconductor manufacturing
or laundry equipment manufacturing, are not especially CO2-intensive.
C Informal Discussion of Trade Policy Theories
This Appendix informally discusses how theories of trade policy might rationalize the paper’s
findings. It is useful to distinguish two reasons why countries choose trade policy. One is
to exploit market power and terms-of-trade externalities. Another is to satisfy domestic
industries which lobby for high tariffs on their output.
Some trade policy instruments, like NTBs and non-cooperative tariffs, are chosen inde-
pendently by countries and are typically not negotiated with other countries. In theories of
explaining such non-cooperative trade policy (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Goldberg and
Maggi 1999), both the terms-of-trade externality and political economy forces determine
tariffs. In these frameworks, governments value the welfare of their citizens, which decreases
overall with protection, but governments also value campaign contributions and other sup-
port from industry, which increases with the protection industries receive. These frameworks
can accommodate industries’ lobbying for low tariffs on industries they use as intermediate
inputs (Gawande et al. 2012). The finding of implicit carbon subsidies in non-cooperative
policy instruments, and the empirical relevance of upstreamness, are consistent with these
theories.
Other trade policy instruments, like most tariffs, are cooperatively chosen by countries
through negotiation. Research has provided two broad explanations for why countries coop-
erate on trade policy (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare 1998, 2007).
One is that cooperation helps decrease terms of trade externalities, though not necessarily
the political economy components of trade policy. A second explanation for cooperation is
that governments understand the political pressure of trade lobbies and the welfare costs of
protection. In this explanation, governments commit to free trade agreements in order to
tie their hands and obtain a more efficient domestic allocation of resources across industries,
while limiting the resulting political cost.
In all these cooperative theories, political economy motives like lobbying for low upstream
tariffs potentially remain an important determinant of non-cooperative and cooperative trade
policy. In Grossman and Helpman (1995), cooperation does not change political economy
motives for trade policy. In the commitment theory, negotiation may attenuate but not elim-
inate political economy’s effects on trade policy. These interpretations suggest that lobbying
competition between upstream and downstream industries may occur in both cooperative
and non-cooperative policies, and extends beyond any single model.
Another general interpretation of this is as follows. A goal of cooperative trade policy
negotiation (e.g., through the World Trade Organization) is to eliminate one externality
– the terms-of-trade motive for trade policy – which leaves political economy motives re-
maining. This paper highlights that those negotiations, however, leave a second externality
untouched—an environmental externality which arises from political economy forces behind
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trade policy.
To be concrete about why counter-lobbying might create tariff escalation, consider the
example of a fairly upstream industry like steel and a fairly downstream good like cigarette
manufacturing. Many industries use steel as an input, either directly (they purchase steel)
or indirectly through global value chains (they purchase goods which use steel as an input,
or goods which use inputs which use steel as an input, etc.). Hence, many industries will
lobby for low tariffs and low NTBs on steel. By contrast, few industries use cigarettes as an
input, and hence few industries will lobby for low tariffs or low NTBs on cigarettes. Final
consumers might prefer low tariffs and low NTBs on both steel and cigarettes, but final
consumers are less well organized than industries, and hence have less lobbying influence.
Thus, countries end up with lower tariffs or NTBs on steel, and higher tariffs or NTBs on
tobacco products.9
Finally, it is worth discussing one potential explanation from public finance. Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971) consider commodity taxation in a general setting. Even in a second-best
world where the government uses (distortionary) linear commodity taxes, which imply that
the first-best Pareto optimal outcome is infeasible, they show that the optimal tax system
maintains the economy at the production possibilities frontier. A corollary is that optimal
commodity taxes apply only to final and not intermediate goods.10
Based on this theorem, one might conjecture that tariff escalation has an efficiency ra-
tionale. This interpretation might claim that downstream goods are final goods, and that
tariff escalation seeks to maintain production efficiency by putting tariffs on final rather
than intermediate goods. In this interpretation, while upstreamness accounts for trade pol-
icy’s environmental bias, the link between upstreamness and trade policy could be caused
by government’s desire for an efficient tax system rather than by lobbying. Additionally, if
tariff escalation reflected efficiency rather than political economy forces, then harmonizing
tariffs between upstream and downstream goods could decrease production efficiency even if
it benefited the environment.
Two reasons suggest that production efficiency does not explain the prevalence of tariff
escalation. First, I find similar escalation in NTBs as in tariffs. NTBs do not raise revenue,
so optimal taxes would not include NTBs, except to the extent that they address market
failures. Hence, production efficiency does not explain why NTBs exist or have escalation.
Second, the production efficiency theorem does not rank the efficiency of different second-
best tax systems by the degree to which they tax intermediate goods. This theory does not
permit stating that a tax or tariff structure which has more escalation is more efficient; it
merely states that the optimal tax system has no taxes on intermediate goods.11
9In the global data, weighted across countries by the value of imports, steel has a mean upstreamness
value of 3.5, tariff of 1.3 percent, and NTB ad valorem equivalent of 1.5 percent. Tobacco products has
upstreamness of 1.2, tariff of 9.8 percent and NTB ad valorem equivalent of 43 percent. These are among
the most and least upstream industries in Exiobase.
10One intuitive explanation is that under constant returns to scale, any tax on intermediate goods would
appear through changes in final goods prices. Then the government could collect the revenue through this
tax on final goods. But because taxing intermediate goods prices distorts firms’ input choices, it moves the
economy away from production efficiency (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971, p. 24).
11A related potential explanation is that distortions in the economy aggregate through upstream input
purchases, so an efficient industrial policy would subsidize upstream sectors (Liu 2018). This interpretation
would argue for direct production subsidies rather than trade policies, and it also would not apply to an
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D General Analytical Model
To study the effects of trade policy’s environmental bias, I use a simple two-country, two-
good model that incorporates existing ideas (Markusen 1975; Copeland 1994; Kortum and
Weisbach 2019). This model encompasses several potentially important features: pollution
can directly affect utility; pollution has transboundary damages; consumers may have non-
homothetic preferences; policy reforms may occur from a sub-optimal baseline; and large
countries may affect world prices.
I consider two countries: A (Home) and B (Foreign), indexed by i. They may trade two
goods: 0 (clean) and 1 (dirty), indexed by s.
Preferences. Let Cis denote the consumption of good s in country i. Let Z de-
note global CO2 emissions. The utility of the representative agent in country i is W
i =
W i(Ci0, C
i
1, Z), i ∈ (A,B).
Technology. Let X is denote the quantity of good i produced in country i. Let F
i(·)
denote the production possibilities frontier: F i(X i0, X
i
1) = 0, i ∈ (A,B). We can also write
the frontier as X i0 = T
i(X i1).
Pollution. Global pollution emissions increase with output of the dirty good in each
country: Z = Z(XA1 , X
B
1 ).
Equilibrium. Let good 0 be the numeraire, let p denote the price ratio of good 1 to
good 0 in country A, and let p∗ denote this price ratio in country B. Country A may impose
a trade tax rate of t on good 1, implying
p∗(1 + t) = p (2)
If country A imports good 1 and t > 0, then this tax rate t is an ad valorem import tariff.
If country A exports good 1 and t > 0, then this tax rate t is an export subsidy. In both
cases, the taxes raises the domestic price p relative to the foreign price p∗.
The first order conditions are useful for deriving comparative statics. Production effi-
ciency implies that producers equate the ratio of their marginal products to the price ratio:
p =
∂FA/∂XA1
∂FA/∂XA0
= −∂T (X
A
1 )
∂XA1
, p∗ =
∂FB/∂XB1
∂FB/∂XB0
= −∂T (X
B
1 )
∂XB1
(3)
I assume T (·) is strictly concave. Consumption efficiency implies that consumers equate the
marginal ratio of substitution to the price ratio:
p =
∂WA/∂CA1
∂WA/∂CA0
, p∗ =
∂WB/∂CB1
∂WB/∂CB0
Define country A’s net exports of good s as es ≡ XAs − CAs . Trade balance implies
e0 + p
∗e1 = 0.
Comparative Statics: Pollution. To study how policy affects pollution, totally dif-
ferentiate the pollution equation Z = Z(XA1 , X
B
1 ):
dZ =
∂Z
∂XA1
dXA1 +
∂Z
∂XB1
dXB1 (4)
undistorted economy already at the first-best.
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I relate this to policy changes through a few steps. First, differentiate the production ef-
ficiency condition (3), define Rn ≡ −[∂2T (X i1)/∂X i1]−1, and substitute into the pollution
derivative (4). Combining this with the total derivative of the price equation (2) gives
dZ = d(1 + t)
[
∂Z
∂XA1
RAp∗
]
+ dp∗
[
∂Z
∂XB1
RB +
∂Z
∂XA1
RA(1 + t)
]
(5)
The terms in equation (5) that include ∂Z/∂XA1 represent the change in home country
pollution emissions due to changes in the home country’s trade policy. The term including
∂Z/∂XB1 represents a change in foreign pollution emissions due to changes in the home
country’s trade policy.
To interpret equation (5), consider first a small open economy, for which policy cannot
change world prices (so dp∗ = 0). Here, increasing the trade tax on dirty goods (d(1+t) > 0)
unambiguously increases global emissions. We can sign the result since prices are positive
(p∗ > 0), pollution increases in both its arguments (∂Z/∂XA1 > 0 ), and R
A>0 due to the
strict concavity of T (·). This result has an intuitive explanation. If a small open economy
raises tariffs on dirty goods, it increases these goods’ domestic price without changing their
world price. Domestic production shifts towards the dirty industry in response to the price
change, but foreign production does not (since world prices are fixed here by assumption).
Of course, a marginal policy change in a small open economy will have small effects on global
emissions.
Results are more ambiguous for a large economy. The first bracketed term in equation
(5) again represents the effect for a small open economy and is positive. The second term
is negative, because tariffs t are nonnegative, emissions increase in both their arguments
(∂Z/∂X i1 > 0), and the technology terms are positive (R
i > 0 ). The key difference in
the second term is that a large economy’s import tariff decreases world prices, so dp∗ < 0.
Intuitively, this policy reform decreases foreign emissions since it decreases foreign prices of
dirty goods. This can also be seen from a simpler version which assumes both countries
have the same emissions and production technology; for this simpler case we get dZ =
(∂Z/∂X1)R(dp+ dp
∗); here every term is positive except dp∗.
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to each argument shows that the following
forces each make a large country’s tariffs on dirty goods decrease global emissions more (or
increase them less). First, this occurs when a country has market power and increasing tariffs
on imports of dirty goods causes a relatively large decrease in world prices (dp∗ is large).
Second, this occurs when foreign production is especially dirty (∂Z/∂XB1 is large). This is
relevant since many countries outsource production of dirty goods to countries that are coal-
intensive in production, such as China, and since international trade requires emissions for
international transportation, which is pollution-intensive. Third, this occurs in settings with
higher baseline tariffs on dirty goods (1 + t is large). Finally, this occurs in settings where
foreign production technology is especially concave (RA is large). This concavity captures
the extent to which decreasing the relative price of dirty goods makes the economy substitute
from dirty to clean production.
Comparative Statics: Welfare. To study how policy affects welfare, totally differen-
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tiate utility:
dW i
∂W i/∂Ci0
= dCi0 +
∂W i/∂Ci1
∂W i/∂Ci0
dCi1 +
∂W i/∂Z
∂W i/∂Ci0
dZ
To write in terms of policy changes, define the social cost of pollution as δi ≡ (∂W i/∂Z)/(∂W i/∂Ci0)
and write the foreign price as a function of Home’s net exports p∗ = E(e1). Then calculate
total derivatives of the definition of net exports, the trade balance condition, the transfor-
mation function, and the definition of foreign price as a function of Home’s net exports.
Combining these results with production efficiency gives the main result that can be used to
study welfare:
dW i
∂W i/∂CA0
=
[
∂p∗
∂e1
e1 − p∗t
]
de1 + δ
idZ (6)
This is essentially the expression used to derive the optimal tariff in Markusen (1975),
although the setting is slightly different. Ignoring pollution by setting δi = 0, this would
imply the standard result that the (privately) optimal tariff equals the inverse export supply
elasticity, which can be found by setting Z = de1 = 0: t
optimal = (∂p∗/∂e1)(e1/p∗). If the
dirty good is imported, increasing import tariffs increases national welfare when baseline
tariffs are below the optimum, and decreases it when baseline tariffs are below the optimum.
Because pollution creates global damages, accounting for pollution creates the same pat-
terns of effects as in equation (5)—changing policy affects both domestic emissions (the last
term in equation (6)) and foreign emissions (the second term in this equation). The effect
of trade policy on welfare here is separable into a traditional term capturing the gains from
trade, and a separate term reflecting pollution damages.
This simple model captures two important ideas about how increasing protection can
affect global emissions, though misses others. Any one country’s protection can increase
domestic emissions. Since this model has only two goods, it does not accommodate intra-
industry trade, and two countries cannot simultaneously impose import tariffs on dirty goods.
In reality, if all countries increase tariffs on dirty goods, production of dirty goods could fall
in all countries, which does not occur from trade policy in a two-good model. Additionally,
because it analyzes small perturbations of existing policy, this abstracts from changes in the
scale of global output. For these and other reasons, the main text discusses analytical results
from a model where goods differ by country of origin.
E Quantitative General Equilibrium Model
I show an Armington model for simplicity and comparability with the 2×2 model in the
main text. A richer Ricardian model (e.g., Eaton and Kortum 2002) would lead to the same
equilibrium equations and hence the same counterfactual results.
Assumption 1 (Preferences): Each country produces one variety per sector. The
representative agent in each destination country j has constant elasticity of substitution
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preferences across the varieties and Cobb-Douglas preferences across sectors s:
Uj =
∏
s
(∑
i
qijs
σs−1
σs
) σs
σs−1βjs
[1 + δ(Z − Z0)]−1 (7)
Here qijs is the quantity of the variety from country i and sector s consumed in country
j, σs > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, and βjs is the Cobb-Douglas expenditure share.
The bracketed term on the right captures the disutility from climate change; δ represents a
damage parameter, Z0 represents a reference or baseline level of global CO2 emissions used
to calibrate the damage parameter, and Z represents the global emissions in a particular
model scenario.
Several reasons support using this functional form for climate damages. It makes dam-
ages multiplicative, which facilitates the analysis of counterfactuals using ratios. It also
makes damages proportional to real income. It permits calibration of the climate damage
parameter δ so that a one-ton increase in CO2 emissions decreases global welfare by $40,
which corresponds with prevailing estimates from the climate change literature (IWG 2016).
Additionally, it provides a simple functional form to accomplish these objectives. This spec-
ification is designed to measure damages from changes in emissions only, since in baseline
data, Z = Z0, so the model abstracts from baseline climate damages.
Assumption 2 (Firms and Production Technology): Goods are produced with a
Cobb-Douglas combination of the factor L and an aggregate intermediate good, which is a
constant elasticity of substitution combination of varieties of intermediate goods:
ajt = (Ljt)
1−ηis
∏
s
(∑
o
qIojst
σs−1
σs
) σs
σs−1ηjst
(8)
The aggregate intermediate good is CES in varieties qIijst shipped from origin country i and
origin industry s to destination country j and destination industry t, and is Cobb-Douglas
across industries. Here ηjst is the intermediate goods share of industry s for production of
industry t in country j.
Buyers pay variable trade costs φijt ≡ τijt(1+tijt)(1+nijt). Here τijt ≥ 1 are iceberg trade
costs, so τ goods must be shipped for one to arrive; I normalize τjjt = 1. Additionally, buyers
pay bilateral import tariffs tijs; tariff revenues are lump-sum rebated to domestic consumers.
I treat NTBs nijs as a multiplicative tariff with revenue that is lost (or, equivalently, as a
form of iceberg trade cost). The quantitative application of this model includes a non-traded
sector; one could interpret this as a sector within infinite trade costs.
Assumption 3 (Pollution): CO2 emissions equal Zis = γisRis/Pis. Here Zis are
the tons of CO2 emitted due to producing goods from industry s in country i, Ris is
country×sector revenue, and Pis is the country×sector price index. The coefficient γ equals
the tons of CO2 per real unit of output in country i and sector s. This variable γ equals
zero for all industries besides coal extraction, oil extraction, and natural gas extraction. For
these three fossil fuel extraction industries, γ equals the metric tons of CO2 per real dollar
of output of a given fossil fuel in a given country.
Assumption 4 (Market Clearing): Market clearing for labor and trade balance are
Li =
∑
s Lis and
∑
j,sXijs =
∑
j,sXjis −Di. Here Lis is factor supply, Di are trade deficits,
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and Xijs is expenditure flows. I assume that in baseline data and in any counterfactual,
consumers maximize utility, firms maximize profits, and markets clear, so the data describe
a competitive equilibrium.
These equations complete the model, and imply several results useful for quantification.
The cost to produce one unit of output is
cis = w
1−ηis
i
∏
k
P ηiksik
This unit cost is Cobb-Douglas in the price of factors wi and intermediates, and also Cobb-
Douglas across the price index of intermediates Pik. Sector s in country j has the following
price index:
Pjs =
(∑
i
(φijscis)
s
) 1
s
Here the price index depends on trade barriers φijs, unit costs cis, and I write equilibrium
equations in terms of the trade elasticity s < 0, which is related to the elasticity of substi-
tution by s ≡ σs − 1.
The share of a country’s expenditure in a given sector which is allocated to a specific
exporter is λijs ≡ Xijs/Xjs, where Xijs is the value of bilateral trade. Consumer utility
maximization implies that this can be written as follows:
λijs =
(φijscis)
s∑
o(φojscos)
s
This is a standard “gravity” equation.
Total expenditure on varieties from sector s in country j equals the Cobb-Douglas ex-
penditure share βjs times total income from factors, trade deficits, and tariffs, plus income
from selling intermediate goods:
Xjs =
βjs
(
Yj +Dj +
∑
i,l
tijl
1+tijl
λijl
∑
k αjlkRjk
)
1−∑i,l tijl1+tijlλijlβjl +
∑
k
αjlkRjk
Revenues for a given country and sector equal pre-tariff bilateral trade, summed over
destinations:
Ris =
∑
j
λijs
1 + tijs
Xjs
By the Cobb-Douglas assumption of the production technology, labor income is a constant
share of total revenues:
Yi =
∑
s
(1− αis)Ris
I rewrite these equations in changes, which produces a system of nonlinear equations.
These equations describe a competitive equilibrium. I now consider how a counterfactual
policy would affect this equilibrium. This counterfactual analysis uses the “exact hat algebra”
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of Dekle et al. (2008). The cost function is the proportional change in wages and intermediate
goods prices, scaled by their Cobb-Douglas expenditure shares:
cˆis = wˆ
1−ηis
i
∏
k
Pˆ ηiksik
The change in the price index is the weighted sum of bilateral prices from each possible
exporter, where weights equal the baseline expenditure shares λijs:
λˆijs =
(φˆijscˆis)
s∑
o λojs(φˆojscˆos)
s
The change in a country’s expenditure on a given sector can be written as
XˆjsXjs =
βjs
(
wˆjYj +Dj +
∑
i,l
t
′
ijl
1+t
′
ijl
λˆijlλijl
∑
k αjlkRˆjkRjk
)
1−∑i,s t′ijs1+t′ijs λˆijsλijsβjs +
∑
k
αjskRˆjkRjk
The change in a country’s revenue from a given sector can be written as
RˆisRis =
∑
j
λˆijsλijs
1 + t
′
ijs
XˆjsXjs
Finally, the change in national income is
YˆiYi =
∑
s
(1− ηis)RˆisRis
For baseline data, these equations hold exactly. Under counterfactual tariffs or NTBs, I
solve this system to find the changes in prices and firm entry that make it hold with equality.
Finally, I use these to find the resulting change in real income, pollution, and social welfare:
Vˆj =
̂Yj +Dj + Tj
Pˆj
Zˆi =
∑
s γisRˆisRis/PˆisPis∑
s γisRis/Pis
Wˆj =
Vˆj
[1 + δ(Z ′ − Z0)]
This uses the notation xˆ = x
′
/x, where x is some variable in the baseline data, x′ is its value
in a counterfactual, and xˆ is the proportional ratio between the two. Here Tj is total tariff
revenue.
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Panel A. Density of tariffs
Panel B. Density of non-tariff barriers
Panel C. Density of Total CO2 intensity
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Appendix Figure 1—Densities of Trade Policy, Carbon Intensity, and Upstreamness
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Panel D. Density of upstreamness
Appendix Figure 1—Densities of Trade Policy, Carbon Intensity, and Upstreamness (Continued)
Notes:  Graphs exclude top 1% of each variable. The value 5 represents the most upstream, while 1 is 
the least upstream. Upstreamness measured as in Antràs et al. (2012).
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Notes:  Data from the U.S. BEA use table for year 2007. Fossil fuel industries include natural gas 
distribution, oil and gas extraction, electricity generation, petroleum refineries, and coal mining. For 
smoothness, for each component of output separately, this analysis estimates a local linear regression of 
the relevant component on upstreamness. The graph shows the fitted values from these regressions. The 
y-axis is the share of an industry's total value of shipments which is accounted for by each of the four 
listed components. The graph describes only manufacturing outputs (though counts intermediate inputs 
from all industries).
Appendix Figure 2—U.S. Upstreamness and Components of Revenues
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Appendix Figure 3—Upstream Location, CO2 Intensity, and Trade Policy, by Country
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Appendix Figure 3—Upstream Location, CO2 Intensity, and Tariff Rates, by Country (Continued)
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Notes:  in each graph, the solid red line is from a local linear regression of import tariffs on the 
industry's upstreamness. The dashed blue line is from a local linear regression of CO2 intensity on the 
industry's upstreamness. Upstreamness is the simple measure of the share of an industry's output sold to 
other industries as intermediate goods (rather than as final demand). All data from Exiobase. All 
regressions use an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth of 0.75. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and 
Taiwan are missing NTB rates, so the red solid line for these countries only includes tariffs.
Appendix Figure 3—Upstream Location, CO2 Intensity, and Tariff Rates, by Country (Continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Main estimates -32.31*** -11.17** -89.78*** -75.67** -5.69*** -6.55*** -47.96*** -37.41***
(8.59) (5.52) (27.33) (30.02) (1.44) (2.30) (10.06) (12.36)
Other econometrics
   2. Tobit (no IV) -35.63*** -5.29 -157.58*** -146.00** -6.19*** -3.61*** -270.19***-156.78***
(11.52) (6.09) (40.74) (59.37) (1.96) (1.30) (60.86) (56.43)
   3. Tobit (IV) -44.10*** -11.57** -191.05*** -154.37** -7.22*** -10.04*** -480.32*** -369.11**
(15.40) (5.74) (56.30) (70.22) (2.29) (3.59) (132.43) (158.31)
   4. Standard errors  -32.31*** -11.17*** -89.78*** -75.67*** — — — —
       clustered by importer (7.71) (3.30) (11.67) (12.84) — — — —
Nonlinearity
  5. Logs -0.65 -0.91** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.64* -0.22 -0.07*** -0.04*
(0.46) (0.43) (0.03) (0.05) (0.36) (0.59) (0.02) (0.02)
  6. Quadratic in emissions
       no IV. CO2 rate -58.33*** 3.58 -194.52*** -152.31 -10.15** -1.29 -45.45* 8.17
(20.32) (14.81) (55.98) (113.86) (4.65) (5.63) (25.49) (27.49)
      CO2 rate
2 9,539.88** -3,508.35 34,582.94**34,420.37 1,260.10 -355.19 1,055.59 -4,798.88
(4,668.97) (4,695.02) (14,405.20)(34,372.49) (807.49) (882.31) (5,166.68) (4,704.39)
     fitted slope, 10th pct. -51.56 1.09 -169.99 -127.89 -9.22 -9.22 4.62 4.62
     fitted slope, 50th pct. -46.70 -0.70 -152.35 -110.34 -8.22 -8.22 0.82 0.82
     fitted slope, 90th pct. -30.26 -6.74 -92.77 -51.04 -4.86 -4.86 -11.99 -11.99
  7. Nonparametric -18.56 — -81.48 — -4.89 -4.89 -41.04 -41.04
       marginal effect (no IV)
Other data cleaning and aggregation
   8. Winsorize dependent, -25.49*** -10.66* -90.36*** -75.69** -5.75*** -6.42*** -51.40*** -38.01***
       independent variables (6.60) (5.39) (27.73) (29.95) (1.62) (2.29) (10.45) (12.69)
   9. Include non-manuf. -32.31*** -9.91 -84.77*** -72.96** — — — —
       industries (8.59) (8.96) (24.07) (33.21) — — — —
Weighted X X X X
(Continued on next page)
Appendix Table 1—Carbon Taxes Implicit in Trade Policy, Sensitivity Analysis
Global US Imports
Tariffs NTBs Tariffs NTBs
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
   10. Multiple partners -37.33** -11.23* -82.63** -75.70** -6.95*** -6.55*** -55.10*** -37.41***
         (i×j×s level data) (16.49) (5.84) (32.19) (29.63) (2.10) (2.29) (12.34) (12.34)
   11. i×j×s level data -38.34** -16.33** -84.46** -93.59** -6.54*** -2.61* -54.23*** -38.40***
        exporter fixed effects (17.11) (6.88) (33.16) (37.43) (1.95) (1.41) (11.87) (14.13)
   12. Industry-level data -21.80** -12.77** -124.16** -78.08* — — — —
        (no IV) (10.38) (5.14) (52.71) (45.14) — — — —
   13. Add intra-national -5.80*** -11.90*** -60.48** -81.84*** — — — —
          trade (1.39) (3.90) (23.32) (21.01) — — — —
Other measures of emissions
   14. Direct emissions -27.48*** -11.53 -78.33*** -104.70*** -7.52*** -10.35*** -63.34*** -59.13***
(7.91) (8.10) (22.30) (34.86) (2.00) (3.71) (16.68) (20.78)
   15. Direct emissions 49.89* -21.03 183.49** 6.37 -1.86 -6.09** -15.98 -35.63**
(28.79) (24.12) (78.40) (135.57) (1.81) (2.49) (16.17) (16.04)
         Total emissions -62.72** 6.55 -212.24*** -76.56 -4.29** -2.70*** -35.86*** -14.87***
(26.28) (16.00) (70.42) (100.21) (1.66) (0.87) (9.14) (4.16)
   16. Include all -16.93*** -6.55** -46.71*** -41.65** — — — —
         greenhouse gases (4.48) (2.56) (14.34) (16.95) — — — —
Consumption emissions from energy-consuming durable goods
  17. Exclude energy- -35.30*** -16.50** -98.47*** -113.23** -9.60*** -17.40*** -60.92*** -66.09***
        consuming durables (9.38) (7.90) (29.80) (47.39) (2.10) (6.50) (14.00) (23.26)
  18. Adjust CO2 rates:  -32.91*** -12.33** -91.04*** -83.46** -6.04*** -8.34** -50.89*** -47.66***
        50% goods, 50% energy (8.73) (6.03) (27.86) (33.52) (1.55) (3.32) (11.11) (16.07)
  19. Adjust CO2 rates: -32.71*** -12.02** -90.51*** -81.35** -6.39*** -11.07* -53.86*** -63.25**
     5% goods, 95% energy (8.69) (5.90) (27.69) (32.39) (1.67) (6.29) (12.31) (30.48)
Additional sensitivity analyses
   20. Reverse regression -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0006*** -0.0003** -0.0040***-0.0040*** -0.0009 -0.0009
         (no IV) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0006)
   21. Lifecycle tariffs -7.80** -5.04 -89.68*** -51.46** — — — —
(3.56) (9.31) (26.99) (25.28) — — — —
Weighted X X X X
(Continued on next page)
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Appendix Table 1—Carbon Taxes Implicit in Trade Policy, Sensitivity Analysis (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
   22. No importer fixed -32.05*** -13.51* -97.58 -83.65*** — — — —
         effects (8.42) (7.18) (55.30) (30.55) — — — —
   23. WIOD, not Exiobase -13.43 -19.88 -19.54 -121.44 — — — —
         (no IV) (12.87) (16.83) (40.09) (84.18) — — — —
  24. Add industry fixed 28.80 7.48 -16.09 123.97 — — — —
        effects (25.46) (15.32) (13.39) (85.56) — — — —
  25. Exclude manuf. -5.29 -5.87 -75.67** -40.81** -5.70*** -6.68*** -36.55*** -37.67***
         food, ag. goods (6.09) (4.52) (30.02) (17.36) (1.47) (2.33) (8.87) (12.22)
Trade war in 2018
  26. U.S. tariffs in 2017 — — — — -4.80*** -4.14** — —
— — — — (1.68) (1.45) — —
  27. U.S. tariffs including — — — — -3.97*** -4.29** — —
        2018 protectionism — — — — (1.43) (1.75) — —
Weighted X X X X
Global US Imports
Notes: All regressions are instrumental variables estimates, except where otherwise noted. All regressions include a constant. 
Parentheses show standard errors clustered by industry except in row 4. In columns 3 and 4, hyphens indicate data which are 
same as row 1 or which are not available for U.S. imports only (e.g., MECS survey does not cover non-manufacturing; WIOD 
v. Exiobase not relevant for U.S. microdata; all greenhouse gases not separately reported). Asterisks denote p-value * < 0.10, 
** < 0.05, *** <0.01.
Appendix Table 1—Carbon Taxes Implicit in Trade Policy, Sensitivity Analysis (continued)
Tariffs NTBs Tariffs NTBs
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. U.S. import tariffs
CO2 rate -6.03*** -4.49** -78.32*** -62.39***
(1.71) (1.94) (12.70) (23.96)
N 374 374 374 374
Dep. Var. Mean 0.020 0.013 0.324 0.275
Panel B. Japanese import tariffs
CO2 rate -54.72*** -44.70 -46.99** -9.18
(16.61) (27.00) (19.06) (13.43)
N 47 47 47 47
Dep. Var. Mean 0.074 0.040 0.072 0.027
Panel C: Chinese import tariffs
CO2 rate 5.25 18.91 -60.50 -3.34
(10.12) (12.01) (54.50) (68.22)
N 47 47 47 47
Dep. Var. Mean 0.088 0.062 0.547 0.397
Weighted X X
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Appendix Table 2—Carbon Taxes Implicit in Cooperative Versus Non-
Cooperative Tariffs
Notes:  U.S. non-cooperative tariffs apply to Cuba and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 
Chinese non-cooperative tariffs apply to Andorra, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Bhutan, the British Virgin 
Islands, the British Cayman Islands, French Guiana, Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza), 
Gibraltar, Monserrat, Nauru, Aruba, New Caledonia, Norfolk Island, Palau, Timor-Leste, San 
Marino, the Seychelles, Western Sahara, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Japanese non-cooperative 
tariffs apply to Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
Lebanon, and Timor-Leste. Other countries receive cooperative tariff rates from these countries. See 
Ossa (2014) for further discussion. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors clustered by 
industry in parentheses. Asterisks denote p-value * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** <0.01.
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Global U.S.
(1) (2)
Panel A: analyzed for all country×industries
  Upstreamness 0.676*** 0.756***
(0.146) (0.098)
  Intra-industry trade -0.152 0.252**
(0.093) (0.105)
  Import pen. ratio 0.031 -0.579***
(0.086) (0.101)
  Labor share -0.146** -0.536***
(0.069) (0.102)
  Mean wage -0.107 -0.389***
(0.127) (0.104)
Panel B: analyzed for U.S. only
  Inverse export supply elasticity — -0.141
— (0.106)
  Output trends, 1972-2002 — 0.026
— (0.105)
  Import pen. ratio 1997-  2002 — -0.085
— (0.105)
  Workers: share with college (%) — -0.176*
— (0.105)
  Four-firm concentration ratio — 0.084
— (0.106)
  Mean firm size — 0.113
— (0.106)
  Standard deviation of firm size — 0.030
— (0.106)
  Capital share — 0.058
— (0.105)
(Continued next page)
Appendix Table 3—Political Economy Variables,
Dirty versus Clean Industries
Regression of variable on "Dirty":
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Global U.S.
(1) (2)
  Shipping cost per 
dollar×kilometer — 0.697***
— (0.100)
  Geographic dispersion — -0.022
— (0.106)
  Workers: unionized (%) — 0.669***
— (0.100)
  Workers: unemployment — -0.063
— (0.106)
  Local pollution 0.601***
(0.102)
  PAC contributions — -0.188*
— (0.104)
Regression of variable on "Dirty":
Notes:  Each table entry is the coefficient from a separate regression of the indicated variable on a dummy for 
whether an observation has above-median total emissions rate and a constant; Column 1 also includes 
country fixed effects. All variables are measured in z-scores. Regressions are weighted by the value of 
imports. Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses. Asterisks denote p-value * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, 
*** <0.01. 
Appendix Table 3—Political Economy Variables,
Dirty versus Clean Industries (Continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. All global trade, weighted
CO2 rate -86.60*** 6.36 -87.83*** -89.11** -87.02*** -90.90**
(33.44) (40.92) (33.00) (35.71) (33.64) (37.97)
Panel B. All global trade, instrument for political economy, weighted
CO2 rate -86.60*** 49.78 -76.18* -113.95* -70.84* -98.21*
(33.44) (52.40) (43.52) (63.04) (38.23) (55.32)
K-P F Statistic — 28.9 9.6 3.9 21.7 24.8
Panel C. U.S. imports, weighted
CO2 rate -49.72*** 2.74 -51.99*** -47.50*** -49.75*** -54.32***
(9.90) (10.19) (10.54) (10.32) (12.19) (10.45)
Panel D. U.S. imports, direct CO 2  only
CO2 rate -70.12*** -4.75 -71.73*** -61.11*** -48.24*** -95.27***
(23.88) (17.20) (19.84) (21.21) (17.80) (27.15)
Panel E. U.S. imports, direct CO 2  only, unweighted
CO2 rate -65.28*** 3.11 -68.47*** -60.83*** -63.07*** -70.97***
(16.13) (11.66) (17.16) (16.32) (17.95) (17.34)
Upstreamness X
Intra-industry X
Import pen. ratio X
Labor share X
Mean wage X
Appendix Table 4—Political Economy Explanations for Implicit Carbon Taxes: One at a Time
Notes:  Dependent variable in all regressions is sum of tariffs and NTBs. Each observation is a 
country×industry (Panels A and B) or industry (Panels C, D, and E). In Panels A, B, and C, CO2 
rate is the total rate from inverting an input-output table, which is instrumented with the direct 
CO2 rate. In panel B only, the political economy variables (upstreamness, intra-industry share, 
etc.) are instrumented with the mean of each political economy variable in the industry of interest 
across the 10 smallest other countries. Panels A and B include country fixed effects. All 
regressions include a constant. Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote p-value * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** <0.01.
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IV IV Lasso IV Lasso
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CO2 rate -29.237 -29.600 -24.780 -112.754* -44.065
(19.444) (29.641) (18.726) (64.063) (41.779)
Upstreamness -0.105*** -0.180*** -0.106*** -0.044*** -0.069***
(0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Intra-industry trade -0.004 -0.051 0 -0.007 0
(0.010) (0.053) 0 (0.015) 0
Import penetration ratio -0.027** -0.234*** 0 -0.016 0
(0.012) (0.072) 0 (0.017) 0
Labor share -0.012* -0.360** 0 -0.042 0
(0.006) (0.159) 0 (0.026) 0
Workers: mean wage 0.003 0.126 0 -0.034* 0
(0.019) (0.078) 0 (0.020) 0
Inverse export supply elast. — — — -0.023** 0
(0.011) 0
Output trends 1972-2002 — — — 0.007 0
(0.011) 0
Trend in import pen. ratio — — — 0.026 0
(0.016) 0
Workers: share w/ college — — — -0.034 0
(0.028) 0
Four-firm conc. ratio — — — -0.059 0
(0.038) 0
Mean firm size — — — 0.109* 0
(0.061) 0
Standard dev. of firm size — — — -0.120* 0
(0.062) 0
Capital share — — — 0.032 0
(0.025) 0
Shipping cost per dollar*km — — — 0.034 0.034
(0.033) (0.029)
Geographic dispersion — — — 0.083 0
(0.053) 0
Workers: unemployed — — — 0.001 0
(0.028) 0
Workers: unionized (%) — — — 0.025 0
(0.017) 0
Local pollution 0.008 0
(0.015) 0
PAC contributions — — — 0.028 0
(0.021) 0
Instrument political economy X
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Appendix Table 5—Political Economy Explanations: All Controls Together
A38
Notes:  Lasso entries of "0" mean the coefficient is exactly zero. CO2 intensity refers to total intensity from the input-
output table. Total CO2 rate is instrumented with direct CO2 rate. In column 2, political economy variables are 
instrumented with their mean in other countries. Columns 1-3 include country fixed effects. Country fixed effects and 
excluded instrument are not penalized in Lasso estimates. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors clustered by 
industry in parentheses.
Appendix Table 5—Political Economy Explanations: All Controls Together (Continued)
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Country Aggregation
Australia
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan
Austria
Belgium
Germany
France
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Brazil
Mexico
Canada
United States
China China
Cyprus
Spain
Greece
Italy
Malta
Portugal
Turkey
Denmark
Finland
United Kingdom
Ireland
Norway
Sweden
India
Indonesia
Rest of the World-Asia and Pacific
Rest of the World-Europe
Rest of the World-Africa
Rest of the World-America
Rest of the World-Middle East
South Africa
Switzerland
Rest of the World
Northern Europe
Indian Ocean
Appendix Table 6—Country Aggregation in General Equilibrium Model
Pacific Ocean
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Latin America
Southern Europe
North America
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Sector Overall
Caliendo 
& Parro 
(2011)
Shapiro 
(2016)
Bagwell et 
al. (2018)
Giri et al. 
(2018)
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing 9.1 9.1 3.3 22.1 —
(1.1) (2.0) (3.6) (1.3) —
Coal and Peat Extraction and Related 5.4 13.5 3.5 5.4 —
(1.0) (3.7) (1.3) (1.7) —
Petroleum Extraction and Related 13.5 13.5 3.5 22.4 —
(1.2) (3.7) (1.3) (11.3) —
Natural Gas Extraction and Related 8.5 13.5 3.5 — —
(1.2) (3.7) (1.3) — —
Other Mining 4.1 13.5 3.5 4.1 —
(0.7) (3.7) (1.3) (0.9) —
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 4.4 2.6 5.3 11.0 3.6
(0.2) (0.6) (2.1) (1.4) (0.3)
Textiles, Textile Products, and Leather 6.4 8.1 18.6 4.6 3.7
(0.2) (1.3) (5.6) (0.9) (0.2)
Wood; Wood and Cork Products 8.2 11.5 5.9 10.5 4.2
(1.0) (2.9) (2.2) (3.0) (1.3)
Pulp and Paper 6.9 16.5 5.8 7.9 3.0
(0.2) (2.7) (3.0) (2.1) (0.2)
Coke, Refined Petroleum, and Nuclear Fuel 9.0 64.9 9.0 — 3.9
(0.5) (15.6) (4.0) — (0.5)
Chemicals, Fertilizer, and Basic Plastics 3.4 3.1 1.6 8.2 3.8
(0.2) (1.8) (3.0) (2.6) (0.2)
Rubber and Plastic Products 3.0 1.7 1.6 9.3 4.3
(0.5) (2.2) (3.0) (3.6) (0.5)
Glass, Cement, Other Non-Metallic Minerals 3.4 2.4 1.6 8.3 4.4
(0.4) (1.6) (3.0) (8.0) (0.4)
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 8.0 5.5 12.9 9.1 6.8
(0.8) (1.6) (8.3) (2.9) (1.0)
Machinery N.E.C. 6.2 1.5 10.8 9.2 3.3
(0.2) (2.8) (2.8) (2.2) (0.2)
Electrical and Optical Equipment 7.9 8.9 10.8 6.9 3.3
(0.2) (0.9) (2.8) (3.6) (0.2)
Transport Equipment 5.7 1.2 6.9 7.0 4.5
(0.5) (0.7) (3.7) (2.9) (0.8)
Manufacturing, N.E.C., Recycling 5.3 4.0 12.8 5.3 —
(0.8) (1.1) (4.6) (1.2) —
Electricity Generation 6.7 4.0 6.7 10.2 —
(1.0) (1.1) (3.2) (5.0) —
All other industries 6.7 4.0 6.7 18.5 —
(1.0) (1.1) (3.2) (9.5) —
Land, pipeline, air, and sea transportation 5.3 4.0 6.7 — —
(1.0) (1.1) (3.2) — —
Appendix Table 7—Sectors and Trade Elasticities
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CO2 Emissions Real Income
CO2 Intensity = 
(1) - (2)
Climate 
damages
Social 
welfare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Counterfactual sets tariffs and NTBs to mean
     1. Global totals -1.55% 0.97% -2.52% -0.03% 1.00%
2. By region
Pacific Ocean 7.71% 0.80% 6.91% — —
Western Europe 8.21% 1.61% 6.60% — —
Eastern Europe 0.58% 1.32% -0.74% — —
Latin America -8.36% 0.85% -9.21% — —
North America -6.11% 0.33% -6.44% — —
China 4.07% 0.97% 3.10% — —
Southern Europe 24.21% 1.36% 22.85% — —
Northern Europe 17.01% 1.72% 15.29% — —
Indian Ocean -1.39% 0.75% -2.14% — —
Rest of World -5.95% 1.17% -7.12% — —
3. Decomposition
Scale 0.79% — — — —
Composition -0.98% — — — —
Technique -1.36% — — — —
4. By Fossil fuel
Coal 0.22% — — — —
Oil -3.14% — — — —
Natural gas -2.92% — — — —
Panel B: Counterfactual sets EU tariffs and NTBs to mean
     5. Global -0.72% 0.60% -1.32% — —
6. By region
Pacific Ocean -1.12% 0.07% -1.19% — —
Western Europe 9.45% 1.50% 7.95% — —
Eastern Europe 0.56% 0.22% 0.34% — —
Latin America -7.04% 0.12% -7.16% — —
North America -0.58% 0.05% -0.63% — —
China -0.20% 0.31% -0.51% — —
Southern Europe 25.22% 1.28% 23.94% — —
Northern Europe 11.99% 1.58% 10.41% — —
Indian Ocean -1.19% 0.13% -1.32% — —
Rest of World -2.67% 0.98% -3.65% — —
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Appendix Table 8—Effects of Counterfactual Tariffs and NTBs on CO2 Emissions and Welfare, General 
Equilibrium Model Estimates
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CO2 Emissions Real Income
CO2 Intensity = 
(1) - (2)
Climate 
damages
Social 
welfare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel C: Counterfactual sets tariffs and NTBs to mean of cleanest third of goods
     Global totals -3.81% 0.38% -4.18% -0.08% 0.46%
Panel D: Counterfactual sets tariffs and NTBs to mean of dirtiest third of goods
     Global totals -2.51% 1.31% -3.83% -0.06% 1.37%
Panel E: All countries add a carbon tariff
     Global totals -0.073% 0.004% -0.077% 0.00% 0.004%
Panel F: All Countries set tariffs and NTBs to zero
     Global totals 3.39% 2.60% 0.80% 0.08% 2.52%
Appendix Table 8—Effects of Counterfactual Tariffs and NTBs on CO2 Emissions and Welfare, General 
Equilibrium Model Estimates (Continued)
Notes:  Global change in real income refers to the weighted mean percentage change in countries' real incomes 
due to a counterfactual policy, where weights equal each country's baseline income. In all baseline and 
counterfactual scenarios, intra-national tariffs and NTBs are assumed to equal zero. 
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CO2 Emissions Real Income
CO2 Intensity = 
(1) - (2)
Climate 
damages
Social 
welfare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Reform All Trade Policy
1. Baseline estimates -1.55% 0.97% -2.52% 0.03% 0.94%
Other data
2. WIOD, not Exiobase -0.37% 0.58% -0.95% 0.02% 0.56%
3. Trade elasticities: -1.51% 0.82% -2.32% -0.08% 0.89%
Caliendo-Parro
Other counterfactuals
4. Harmonize within importer -0.92% 1.05% -1.97% 0.03% 1.02%
5. Harmonize tariffs only -0.77% 0.08% -0.85% 0.03% 0.05%
6. Harmonize NTBs only -0.79% 0.85% -1.64% 0.00% 0.85%
Other estimation methods
7. First remove trade deficits -1.61% 0.97% -2.59% 0.00% 0.97%
8. Algorithm: trust-region -1.55% 0.97% -2.52% 0.03% 0.94%
9. Algorithm: Levenberg- -1.55% 0.97% -2.52% 0.03% 0.94%
Marquardt
Notes:  See notes to Table 5. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates refer to changes in both tariffs and NTBs. 
Appendix Table 9—Effects of Counterfactual Tariffs and NTBs on CO2 Emissions and Welfare, Sensitivity 
Analysis
A44
